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COMMENT
AN ALL-ENCOMPASSING PRIMER ON STUDENTATHLETE NAME, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS RIGHTS AND
HOW O'BANNON V. NCAA AND KELLER V. NCAA
FOREVER CHANGED COLLEGE ATHLETICS
John A. Maghameze
I. INTRODUCTION

While paying student-athletes has been a controversial issue for years,
recent events have pushed the issue to the forefront of the sports world. The
attempted unionization by collegiate football players,' the suspensions of
several high-profile collegiate athletes,2 the sanctioning of several major
universities,3 and recent monumental lawsuits4 have resulted in a
contentious state of affairs for the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(the "NCAA"). This Comment will analyze the history of the NCAA
amateurism policies, predict the outcome of Keller, conduct an in-depth
analysis of O'Bannon, and provide a solution for the problem.

t Student Development Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 9; J.D.
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2015); B.A., Political Science/Government,
University of Virginia (2012); University of Virginia Varsity Football Team: Offensive Line
(2008-12). The biggest thank you to my parents, Al and Michele, and my sisters, Jessica and
Kristin, for constantly encouraging me to pursue my dream and for making all of this
possible. You have always been my biggest fans, whether it is in the courtroom or on the field
and words cannot express my love and gratitude for you. Thank you also to all of my
coaches, specifically Coach Pierce, Coach London, and Coach Wachenheim for constantly
pushing me to be better and for teaching me what it means not just to be a football player,
but a man. Lastly, a special shout out to my law school "brothers" for keeping me sane
through it all.
1. Justin Baragona, Jon Stewart Annihilates the NCAA's Argument Against StudentAthlete's Unionizing,POLITICS USA (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.politicususa.com/2014/04/11
/jon-stewart-annihilates-ncaas-argument-student-athletes-unionizing.html.
2. See discussion infra Part II.A.
3. Associated Press, Ohio State Vacates All 2010 Victories, ESPN (July 22, 2011),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6749330; see Gary Klein, For USC Athletics,
NCAA Sanctions are Ending, but Effects Remain, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/usc/la-sp-usc-ncaa-sanctions-20140608-story.html#page= 1.
4. See discussion infra Parts V-VI.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Famous "Law-Breaking"Student-Athletes
Recently, three high-profile college athletes were forced into the spotlight
for violating the NCAA's rules prohibiting student-athletes from accepting
any compensation for the use of their name or likeness. Texas A&M's
Johnny Manziel was suspended for the first half of the opening game of the
2013 season for allegedly being paid to sign autographs during the
offseason.' Ohio State's Terelle Pryor was suspended, along with other
teammates, for five games for selling his jersey and memorabilia in
exchange for free tattoos.6 Georgia's Todd Gurley was suspended four
games for being paid to sign autographs Georgia's A.J. Green was
suspended for four games for selling his bowl-game jersey to an agent.'
What did these college superstars all have in common? They all were
punished or investigated by the NCAA for violating the NCAA's
amateurism policies forbidding players from accepting any form of
compensation in association with their persona as an "amateur" athlete.'
Each player was a transcendent figure in the college football world who
likely created substantial value for his name brand because of his
achievements on the football field.1" Yet, each player was prevented from
5. Tom

Fornell, Johnny Manziel Suspended for First Half of Rice Game,

CBSSPORTS.COM

(Aug.

28,

2013),

http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-

collegefootball/23366173 /johnny-manziel-suspended-for-first-half-of-rice-game.
6. Associated Press, Ohio State Vacates All 2010 Victories, ESPN (July 22, 2011),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6749330.
7. Andy Staples, Todd Gurley Suspension Ruling Shows Major Problems with NCAA's
System,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Oct.
29,
2014),
http://www.si.com/collegefootball/2014/10/29/todd-gurley-georgia-bulldogs-ncaa-suspension.
8. NCAA UPHOLDS A.J. GREEN'S SUSPENSION, ESPN (SEPT. 28, 2010),
HTTP://SPORTS.ESPN.GO.COM/NCF/NEWS/STORY?ID=5585220.
9. See discussion infra Part III.A.
10. Johnny Manziel won the Heisman Trophy as a freshman. Johnny Manziel Wins
Heisman Trophy, Fox SPORTS (June 6,2014),
http://www.foxsports.com/c/coegefootbafl/story/johnny-manziel-heisman-trophy-texas-amaggies-quarterback-first-freshman-to-win-beats-out-mantiteo-cofin-klein-120812. Todd Gurley was a leading Heisman candidate until his suspension.
Chip Towers, Ten@10: ESPN's Herbstreit Believes Gurley Could Still Win Heisman, AJC.coM
(Oct 21, 2014), http://ugasports.blog.ajc.com/2014/10/21/tenO-espns-herbstreit-believesgurley-could-still-win-heisman!. Terrelle Pryor was the top-ranked prospect out of high school
by several recruiting services, and the Rose Bowl MVP. Terrelle Pryor Player Profile (Aug. 5,
2010),
http://www.ohiostatebuckeyes.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/pryorjterreeOO.html.
A.J.
Green was voted an All-American and SEC Freshman of the Year. Paul Dehner Jr., Crossing
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profiting from his image rights by the NCAA's amateurism policies
prohibiting collegiate athletes from accepting any form of compensation in
relation to his persona as a student-athlete.1 1 Not only was each player
prevented from profiting off of his own image, but each player was also
required to grant any rights to his image to the NCAA in order to become
eligible to compete for his school. 2
B. By the Numbers
Companies and courts alike have pointed to the non-profit status of the
NCAA-specifically, the promotion and preservation of the concept of
amateurism-as justification for the continuation of the current system. 3
This concept has slowly lost credibility, however, as college sports, like
football and basketball, have grown into a colossal commercial enterprise.
The NCAA, its member schools, and many third parties profit immensely
from college athletics. As a whole, college athletics generates $11 billion in
annual revenues.' 4 CBS and Turner Sports reached a deal with the NCAA in
2011 worth $10.8 billion for the next fourteen years of television rights to
March Madness-the annual NCAA postseason basketball tournament."5
The deal is only for the postseason basketball tournament and does not
include the television revenue created for the thirty-plus regular season
games each college basketball team plays or the revenue from football. 6 On
top of that, the 2012 "March Madness" tournament generated over $1

Patterns: A.J. Green vs. Julio Jones, CINCINNATI.COM
(Sept.
13,
2014),
http://www.cincinnati.com/story /sports/nfllbengals/2014/09/13/cincinnati-bengals-aj-greenjulio-jones/15605949/.
11. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
12. Id.
13. See discussion infra Part VI.A.2.a.
14. Marc Edelman, The Casefor Paying College Athletes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan.
6, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/01/06/ncaa-college-athletes-should-

be-paid.
15. Time Warner Joins CBS in $10.8 Billion March Madness TV Deal, FoxBUSINESS (Apr.
22, 2010),

http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/04/22/time-warner-joins-cbs-biion-marchmadness-tv-deal/.
16. id.
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billion in advertisement sales revenue. 7 The retail market for collegiate
licensed merchandise is worth $4.6 billion.'
Universities and conferences also generate extraordinary amounts of
revenue from their major athletic programs. In 2013, the University of
Texas's revenue stream from football alone was $109 million, and the
football program's value is estimated at $139 million.' 9 The five Bowl
Championship Series (BCS) conferences-the Atlantic Coast Conference
(ACC), the Big Ten, the Big 12, the Southeastern Conference (SEC), and the
Pacific-12 (Pac-12)-generated over $1.4 billion combined from the
television rights, the football bowl game payouts, and the tournaments.2 °
This figure does not include ticket sales, concessions, merchandise revenue,
or any other licenses granted by the schools in connection with their
athletic teams (e.g. video game licenses). The Big Ten was the most
profitable conference in the NCAA in 2013 with a revenue stream of $310
million.2' It is believed that the conference could increase its revenue by
$100 million in 2016 by adding several other schools to the conference.22
Each school in the Big Ten receives close to $13 million in basketball
revenue alone.23
College coaches are highly compensated for their jobs. Nick Saban, head
football coach at the University of Alabama, recently signed a contract
entitling him to a salary of $7 million annually. 24 Among the forty-four head
coaches in the BCS conferences, the average annual salary is $2.1 million.25
17. Anthony Crupi, Show Me the Moneyball: March Madness Generates$1 Billion in Ad
Sales, ADWEEK (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.adweek.com/news/television/show-memoneyball-march-madness-generates- 1-billion-ad-sales- 147732.
18. About CLC: Connecting Passionate Fans to College Brands, COLLEGIATE LICENSING
Co., http://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
19. College Football's Most Valuable Teams 2013, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com
/pictures/emdm45efmkf/1-texas-longhorns-3/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
20. Chris Smith, The Most Valuable Conferences in College Sports, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/01/16/the-most-valuable-conferences-in-coflege-

sports/.
21. Big Ten-In Photos: The Most Valuable Conferences in College Sports, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/emdm451mel/1-big-ten/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2014). This
statistic was calculated by accounting for revenue, bowl revenue, and NCAA tournament
revenue of every athletic program a school has. Id.
22. Id.

23. Patrick Rishe, Revenue ComparisonsAmong Division I Men's Basketball Conferences,
FORBES (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/03/0 1/revenue-

comparisons-among-division-i-mens-basketball-conferences/2/.
24. Edelman, supra note 14.
25. Id.
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The highest paid public employee in forty of the U.S. states is the state
university's head football or basketball coach.26 Additionally, the NCAA
pays its president, Mark Emmert, $1.7 million annually.2 7 Clearly, there is a
lot of money in college athletics.
Recently, a report came out calculating the fair market value of college
basketball players at the top twenty revenue-producing college basketball
schools." At the top-ranked school of 2013, Louisville, each player is
reportedly worth more than $1.5 million.29 The twentieth-ranked school's
players are valued at over $500,000 each. °
Despite such a significant amount of revenue generated annually by
college sports, and with student-athletes' values as high as they are, many
players still struggle to cover miscellaneous expenses not covered under the
standard grant-in-aid scholarship issued by NCAA Division I schools,
which is the maximum scholarship given to even the elite student-athletes.3
These scholarships cover only tuition, books, and room and board; and
many of them are only guaranteed for one year. 32 Student-athletes on grantin-aid scholarships in the NCAA pay an average of $3,222 per year out of
their own pockets for expenses incurred while in school.3 3 Over four years,
that amounts to an accumulation of personal debt of $12,888. Recent
studies compiled by the O'Bannon legal counsel found that student-athletes
can leave school with as much as $30,000 in debt despite possessing a full
athletic scholarship. 3 Additionally, many student-athletes sustain injuries
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Sam Vecenie, Report: Lbusiville Basketball Team Worth $1.5 million PerPlayer?,CBS
(Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/eye-on-collegebasketball/24897427/report-louisville-basketbaU-team-worth- 15-million-per-player.
29. Id. The fair market value of the players is determined by implementing a revenue
sharing system that the NBA currently uses, giving 51% of the money generated to the
schools and 49% to the players. Id.
30. Id.
31. O'BANNON v. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 7 F. SupP. 3D 955, 971 (N.D. CAL.
SPORTS

2014); SEE JON SOLOMON, COLLEGE ATHLETES' RIGHTS: EFFORT TO MAKE SCHOLARSHIPS COVER
ALL COSTS MEETS RESISTANCE, AL.COM (DEC.

30 2011), http://www.a.com/sports/index.ssf

/201 1/12/college-athletesjrights-effort.html.
32. How Do Athletic Scholarships Work?, NCAA (2012), http://www.ncaa.org/sites
/default/files/NCAA%2BAthletics%2BScholarships.pdf.
33. Ramogi Huma & Ellen J. Staurowsky, The Priceof Poverty in Big Time College Sports,
NAT'L COLL. PLAYERS ASS'N 4, available at http://www.ncpanow.org/research/body/ThePrice-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-Colege-Sport.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
34. Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 5 547, In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW (N.D. Cal. 2013), WL 3810438.
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that require ongoing medical treatment after they are no longer enrolled in
school." While the NCAA enacted a rule requiring that players have
medical insurance while they are participating in athletics for the school,
some of those insurance plans do not fully cover all medical expenses and
some schools do not cover the additional medical expenses incurred while a
student-athlete is playing for the university. 6 This severely hampers a
player's future, causing participation in college athletics to become a burden
when it should be a blessing.
III.

A.

HISTORY OF THE NCAA AND THE CURRENT SYSTEM

The Concept of Amateurism

One of the NCAA's primary objectives, as delineated by the 2013-2014
NCAA Division I Manual (the "NCAA Bylaws"), is its commitment to the
concept of amateurism. It requires its member schools to comply with its
standards of "scholarship and amateurism"37 and to "maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program" by
"retain[ing] a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports."3" The NCAA Bylaws describe "amateurism" saying,
"[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in
intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises."39
Under Section 12.1.2, entitled "Amateur Status," the NCAA Bylaws outline
the requirements that a student-athlete must comply with to maintain his or
her amateur status and list activities that will cause a student-athlete to be
stripped of amateur status:4 °
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible
for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the
individual:

35. Id. at 5 548.

36. Id.
37. See Nat'l Athletic Assoc'n, 2013-14 NCAA Division I Manual, art. 2.9 (2013),
available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/Dl14.pdf [hereinafter
"NCAA Bylaws"]; see also id. at art. 1.2(c).
38. Id. at art. 1.3.1.
39. Id. at art. 2.9.
40. Id. at art. 12.1.2.
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Uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay
in any form in that sport;
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received
athletics
completion
of intercollegiate
following
(a)

participation ....

.4

B. National Letter of Intent, NCAA Bylaw 12.5, and Form 08-3a: Required
Paperwork
Every February, on a day known as National Signing Day, hundreds of
high school seniors all across the country sign their National Letter of
Intent and their Statement of Financial Aid, which are contracts binding
them to the respective schools of their choice.4" Both of these contracts
specifically incorporate the NCAA Bylaws, requiring student-athletes to
fulfill all NCAA requirements in order to be, and to remain, eligible to
receive their scholarships.43 Many of these seniors are still only seventeen
years old and are making one of the biggest decisions of their lives, some
with little or no guidance. Additionally, once these students step foot on
campus as freshmen, but prior to participating in training camp, they are
required to read and sign a plethora of forms waiving rights and agreeing to
policies they are not fully aware of.44 Among the piles of paperwork are both
NCAA Form 08-3a and NCAA Bylaw 12.5." If a student-athlete does not
sign these forms each year, that player is not eligible to play.46
41. Id.
42. See generally National Letter of Intent, NCAA ELIGIBILITY CENTER (Oct. 13, 2014),
Story-Inserts/graphi
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/CNBC/Sections/News-And-Analysis/
cs/-PDF/NLI_2010_201 1.pdf; Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College
National Letter of Intent: A Contractby Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1284 n.20
(1989) (stating that courts have ruled that a scholarship agreement and its accompanying
forms constitute a contract).
43. Leslie E. Wong, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O'Bannon Takes on the
NCAA for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete's Right of Publicity,42 TEX. TECH L.REv.
1069, 1073-74 (2010).
44. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.1.1.1.3.
45. NCAA Form 08-3a, NCAA (2008-2009) available at http://www.ukathletics.com

/docjlib/compliance08O9_sa statement.pdf [hereinafter NCAA Form 08-3a]; see generally
NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.5.

46. NCAA Form 08-3a, supra note 45. The form provides:
If you are an incoming freshman, you must complete and sign Parts I, II, III, IV
[statement concerning the promotion of NCAA championships and other
NCAA events], V and VII to participate in intercollegiate competition. If you
are an incoming transfer student or a continuing student, you must complete
and sign Parts I, II, III, IV, V and VI to participate in intercollegiate
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NCAA Bylaw Section 12.5, labeled "Promotional Activities," governs
permitted uses of a player's "name, picture, or appearance" by schools,
conferences, or non-profits,47 and restricts the student-athlete from
accepting anything of value for the use of their own image or likeness
related to their athletic identity.4" It forbids student-athletes or any agency
other than a non-profit from utilizing a student-athlete's name, picture, or
appearance to promote commercial ventures or to sell commercial items
featuring the student-athlete's name, likeness, or picture. '9Ultimately, the
NCAA Bylaws place the player's name, likeness, and image rights solely in
the hands of the school, the NCAA, or member institutions for
"promotional activity" without designating a specific timeframe for these
rights to be held."0
competition. Before you sign this form, you should read the Summary of
NCAA Regulations provided by your director of athletics or his or her designee
or read the bylaws of the NCAA Division I Manual that deal with your
eligibility.
Id.; see NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.1.1.1.3; and O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190, *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
47. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.5.1; see O'Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *1-2.
48. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.5.2.1.
After becoming a student-athlete, an individual shall not be eligible for
participation in intercollegiate athletics if the individual:
(a) Accepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her name or
picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a
commercial product or service of any kind; or
(b) Receives remuneration for endorsing a commercial product or service
through the individual's use of such product or service.
Id.
If a student-athlete's name or picture appears on commercial items (e.g., Tshirts, sweatshirts, serving trays, playing cards, posters) or is used to promote a
commercial product sold by an individual or agency without the studentathlete's knowledge or permission, the student-athlete (or the institution acting
on behalf of the student-athlete) is required to take steps to stop such an
activity in order to retain his or her eligibility for intercollegiate athletics. Such
steps are not required in cases in which a student-athlete's photograph is sold
by an individual or agency (e.g., private photographer, news agency) for private
use.
Id. at art. 12.5.2.2. "Astudent-athlete may not participate in any promotional activity that is
not permitted under Bylaw 12.5.1."
Id. at art. 12.5.2.4.
49. Id. at art. 12.5.2.
50. See id. at art. 12.5.1.1.1. ("The NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA
(e.g., host institution, conference, local organizing committee)] may use the name or picture
of an enrolled student-athlete to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA
events, activities or programs.").
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The other required document, NCAA Form 08-3a, requires the studentathlete to give the NCAA permission to use his image and likeness to
"promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities or
programs.""1 This provision is identical to that found in NCAA Bylaw
12.5.1.1.2 It too requires the player to affirm that he has read all of the
relevant NCAA Bylaws incorporated in the document and to accept all of
the amateurism and eligibility policies.5 3 These forms are to be filled out by
both scholarship players and walk-on players alike. 4
C. The Irony of the CurrentSystem
Through the combination of the clauses above, uninformed studentathletes allegedly forfeit all rights to license their individual and group
images and likenesses.55 Ironically, all of the above contracts and regulations
were implemented to prevent commercial exploitation of college athletics
and distinguish amateur sports from professional sports,56 yet the NCAA
and the schools receive billions in revenue from these licenses. 7 The NCAA
and individual schools are able to enter into license agreements on behalf of
the players through its licensing group, the Collegiate Licensing Company
(the "CLC"), which then sells the licenses to third parties, such as Electronic
Arts, Inc. ("EA"), so that everyone may profit off of the players except the
individual who is creating value out of his identity in the first place.5
51. NCAA Form 08-3a, supra note 45.
52. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.5.1.1.1.
53. NCAA Form 08-3a, supra note 45.

54. Id. The phrase "For: Student-athletes" suggests that any person competing as a
student-athlete must sign it, not just scholarship student-athletes. As a former walk-on
player at the University of Virginia, I had to sign this form, so I also know from experience.
A "walk-on" (a player not receiving a scholarship to be on the team) receives no
consideration for the use of his name, image, or likeness like scholarship players who are at
least receiving a free education. In essence, a "walk-on" is paying the school full tuition, up to
approximately $60,000 a year, in order for the school to use his image rights for their profit.
Peter Jacobs, America's REAL Most Expensive Colleges, Bus. INSIDER (July 10, 2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-expensive-colleges-in-america-2013-7?op= 1.
55. John Infante, Mike Corgan & Peter Baran, NCAA Student-Athlete Licensing
Program-How Could It Happen and What Are the Elements?, WINTHROP INTELLIGENCE

(May 6, 2012), http://winthrop intelligence.com/2012/05/06/student-athlete-licensingprogram-how-could-it-happen-and-what-are-the-elements/.
56. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at arts. 1.3.1 & 2.9.
57. About CLC: Connecting PassionateFans to College Brands, COLLEGIATE LICENSING

Co., http://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
58. Licensing Info: NCAA/Bowls/Conferences, COLLEGIATE LICENSING Co., http://clc.com
/Licensing-Info/NCAA-Bowls-Conferences-Events.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
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As it stands now, the NCAA, utilizing the CLC, allegedly holds the
licensing rights to players that have graduated and are no longer
participating in college athletics.5 9 Yet, nowhere in the NCAA Bylaws does it
permit the NCAA or any other entity to license student-athletes' likenesses
to third parties for commercial use, like EA's use of them in its video
games.' In fact, the NCAA Bylaws seem to prohibit the use of a studentathlete's likeness for commercial profit.61
IV. O'BANNON AND KELLER, FORMERLY, IN RE NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE
NAME & LIKENESS

A. Introduction to O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
Ed O'Bannon was a former NCAA basketball star for the UCLA Bruins
who won a national championship in 1995.62 He was named the NCAA
Tournament's Most Outstanding Player during his title run, and was voted
an All-American.63 Upon seeing highlight reels and video games that were
still using his player avatar two decades after graduating college, O'Bannon
realized that the NCAA, and other third parties, were profiting off of his
image and athletic accomplishments many years later while he received
absolutely nothing.64
The O'Bannon v. NCAA lawsuit originated in 2009 and has been gaining
steam ever since news broke to the press. 6 O'Bannon, later joined by
twenty-four other former student-athletes, including Oscar Robertson,66
sued the NCAA, CLC, and EA for antitrust violations and right of publicity
59. See O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190,
*1-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).

60. See generally NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37.
61. Id. at art. 2.9.
62. Steve Eder & Ben Strauss, UnderstandingEd O'Bannon's Suit Against the N.C.A.A.,
N.Y.

TIMES

(June 9, 2014),

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball

/understanding-ed-obannons-suit-against-the-ncaahtml?_r=0
63. Id.
64. Id.; Rob Dauster, The Latest in the Ed O'Bannon Case, and Why the NCAA's Headed
for Change, NBCSPORTS.COM (May 8, 2013), http://collegebasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013
/05/08/the-latest-in-the-ed-obannon-case-and-why-the-ncaas-headed-for-change/.
65. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190, *2

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
66. Oscar Robertson is a Hall of Fame professional basketball player who was also
involved in a famous antitrust suit against the NBA in 1970, a suit very similar to this suit.
Ron Flatter, Oscar Defined the Triple-Double, ESPN.coM, http://espn.go.com/sportscentury
/features/00016428.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
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claims, alleging that the three defendants "conspired to deprive them of
their rights of publicity and engaged in unlawful restraints of trade in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act."67 The main premise of the suit was that
current and former student-athletes should no longer be bound to the
NCAA's control of their images and likenesses.68 In addition to controlling
current players' image rights, the NCAA is able to control the image and
likenesses of former players who have not signed Form 08-3a and have
since graduated or left school for other reasons.6 9 The complaint alleged that
college athletes can be depicted in video games, and jerseys with their
number on it can be sold at school stores, yet the athletes still cannot receive
profit from any revenue that the school and third parties make.7 °
B. Introduction to Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
At roughly the same time the O'Bannon suit originated, a similar lawsuit
arose named Keller v. ElectronicArts Inc.7" Samuel Keller, a former starting
quarterback for Arizona State University and the University of Nebraska,
initiated the suit after receiving no compensation for the use of his image in
the EA NCAA video games.7 Keller filed a suit similar to O'Bannon against
the same parties-EA Sports, CLC, and the NCAA-but his suit revolved
around the right of publicity violations instead of the antitrust claims.73
Keller sought only compensatory damages, whereas O'Bannon sought
compensatory damages and an injunction that would force the NCAA to
eliminate the rule that prohibits college athletes from being paid for their
image rights from video games and television broadcasts." Since the two
67. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL
5644656, *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010).
68. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. C 09-3329 CW, 2014 WL 3899815,
962-63 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014).
69. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190, *5
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
70. Class Action Complaint at 7, O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CV 09
3329, WL 2416720 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
71. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, "1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010), affd sub nom., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724
F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
72. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 127172 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. dismissed sub nom., Elec. Arts Inc. v. Keller, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014).
73. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 3-4, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No.
C 09-01967 CW, WL 908883 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
74. Ben Strauss & Steve Eder, N.C.A.A. Settles One Video Game Suit for $20 Million as a
Second Begins, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports
/ncaafootball/ncaa-settles-sam-keller-video-game-suit- for-20-million.html?_r=0.
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suits dealt with substantially similar subject matter, the federal court for the
Northern District of California consolidated the two cases into one, entitled
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation.7"
C. Settlement with EA and CLC
The case took a dramatic shift after all the defendants' motions to dismiss
were denied, except the antitrust claim against EA, and after the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that EA's use of former
players' likenesses was not protected by the First Amendment. 76 On
September 26, 2013, O'Bannon and Keller, on behalf of current and former
college players, entered into a settlement agreement with EA and CLC,
77
leaving the NCAA as the only remaining defendant.
On November 8, 2013, Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California partially granted certification for a
7
class action lawsuit while partially denying another key part of the lawsuit.

The judge certified a class action suit for an injunction against NCAA rules
that prevent student-athletes from entering into contracts with licensing
groups. 79 The judge, however, denied class certification for damages for
student-athletes being compensated for the past use of their images and
likenesses on television and video games."0 This was a shocking blow to the
lawsuit that relieved the NCAA of substantial amounts of potential
monetary damages for past and current student-athletes. This did not have
an effect on the plaintiffs' right to receive monetary damages, just on
making the case a class action so that all former college athletes who felt
wronged could join and recover damages. Still, the lawsuit's principal
motive of changing the NCAA Bylaws so that student-athletes could be
compensated was still intact.8 " With such potentially drastic ramifications,

75. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL
1642256 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).

76. See infra text accompanying notes 133-36.
77. Players to Receive $40 million, ESPN (Sept. 28, 2013), http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story/jid/9731696/ea-sports-clc-settle-lawsuits-40-million-source.
78. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., C 09-1967 CW,
2013 WL 5979327, *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013).
79. Id. at *7.
80. Id.at*8-10.
81. O'Bannon v. Natil Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal.
2014).
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the NCAA publicly stated that it would refuse to settle the claims and was
willing to fight "all the way to the Supreme Court."82
Despite consolidating the O'Bannon and Keller cases in 2010, Judge
Wilken ruled to deconsolidate the two cases into their original separate
filings after the NCAA and Keller plaintiffs asked for the issue of the right of
publicity and of antitrust to be tried separately. s3 Judge Wilken declared that
the two claims from In re Student-Athlete Likeness were distinct enough to
split the actions into two separate disputes. s4 Additionally, she stated that
the facts from each claim were separate and distinct so as not to rule on
each case twice. 5 Judge Wilken declared that the O'Bannon case would
decide the antitrust issue and the Keller case would represent the right of
publicity claims filed under California law. 6
After Judge Wilken deconsolidated the two cases, the NCAA, the sole
remaining defendant left in both Keller and O'Bannon after the settlements
by EA and CLC, and the Keller plaintiffs settled the right of publicity case
for $20 million on June 9, 2014.87 The Keller trial was set for March 2015.88
This left the O'Bannon case and its antitrust claim against the NCAA as the
last remaining issue to be solved.
V. STUDENT-ATHLETES AND THEIR RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
PREDICTING THE OUTCOME OF KELLER

A. Background
The right of publicity-a fairly new cause of action-was first
established as a common law right in 1953 in the case Haelan Laboratories,

82. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Vows to Fight O'Bannon Suit to the Supreme Court,
USATODAY (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2013/09/26/ncaaed-obannon-ea-sports-lawsuit-supreme-court/2877579/.
83. Keller v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, C 09-1967 CW, 2014 WL 2191464, *3(N.D.
Cal. May 23, 2014).
84. Id.
85. Id. The only two areas of fact that would coincide would be: 1) whether the studentathletes' likenesses were used in EA video games; and 2) whether college athletes consented
to that use, but both were secondary issues in the antitrust litigation. Id.
86. Id.
87. Ben Strauss & Steve Eder, N.C.A.A. Settles One Video Game Suitfor $20 Million as a
Second Begins,

N.Y.

TIMES

(June

9,

2014),

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10

/sports/ncaafootball/ncaa-settles-sam-keller-video-game-suit-for-20-milion.html?-r=o.
88. Keller v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, C 09-1967 CW, 2014 WL 2191464, *5 (N.D.
Cal. May 23, 2014).
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Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.89 In Haelan, a baseball player entered into a
contract granting the exclusive right to use his photograph to a chewing
gum manufacturer. 9° Defendant, a rival chewing gum manufacturer,
knowing of the contract between the plaintiff and the baseball player,
induced the player into a contract authorizing the manufacturer to use the
player's photograph in connection with the sale of their chewing gum. 9' The
defendant maintained that a right of privacy could not be an exclusive
property interest and the right only guaranteed the baseball player "a
personal and non-assignable right not to have his feelings hurt by such a
publication."92 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately held that, in
addition to one's right of privacy, there is a separate and distinct right of
publicity that enables one to protect his commercial identity. 93
B. Modern Approach
Today, many states recognize that the violation of the right of privacy
and the violation of the right of publicity give rise to two distinct claims,
although some states still unify the two into one claim. 94 The Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition takes the former approach and establishes
the elements of one's right of publicity: 1) use of the plaintiffs name,
likeness, or other indicia of identity; 2) appropriation of the commercial
value of.plaintiffs identity; and 3) without the plaintiffs consent.95 Many
common law rules require a fourth element-that there be a resulting
injury to the plaintiff.96
"[T]he right of publicity.., secures for plaintiffs the commercial value of
their fame and prevents the unjust enrichment of others seeking to

89. Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, "].1. Morrison" and His Right of PublicityLawsuit Against
the NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 261 (2008) (citing Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953)).
90. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953).
91. Id.
92. Hanlon, supra note 89, at 262 (quoting Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953)).
93. Id. at 262-63.
94. Id. at 263.
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
96. Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
Eastwood v. Super. Ct. for L.A. County, 198 Cal. Rptr. 341,347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)); Stewart
v. Rolling Stone LLC, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Eastwood v.
Super. Ct. for L.A. County, 198 Cal. Rptr. 341,347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
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appropriate that value for themselves."97 The majority of states have
determined that the right of publicity extends to all people, not just
celebrities.9" Right of publicity claims are largely a state law issue, although
federal law does provide some legal limitations on use of a person's identity
without permission.99 The Supreme Court has only heard one right of
publicity case in its history, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, in
1977.00 In Zacchini, the Court held that a broadcasting company's

television broadcast of a human cannonball's entire fifteen second act was
not entitled to a First Amendment defense, thus cementing the right of
publicity as an official cause of action.'' The Court implemented a
balancing test, weighing the interests of the First Amendment against those
encompassed by the right of publicity. °2 Almost every court still uses a
version of this balancing test today for right of publicity defenses, but the
approaches have developed over time." 3 The two modern balancing tests
most utilized today are the "transformative use" test and the Rogers test."
1. Rogers Test
The Rogers test was established in 1989 in Rogers v. Grimaldi, a Lanham
Act case revolving around trademarks and consumer protection. 0 5 New
York courts created this test, applying Oregon law when Oregon had no
precedent regarding a right of publicity claim.0 6 This test looks to the
relationship between the celebrity image and the work as a whole in
comparison to the First Amendment right to freedom of expression. 07 This
test arguably only applies to celebrities," 8 and would likely not benefit any
student-athletes who would not be categorized as celebrities. Additionally,
the test is derived from Lanham Act cases involving trademarks, and most

97.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c

98. Jonathan Faber, Brief History of RoP,

RIGHT

(1995).

OF PUBLICITY

(Mar. 2000),

http://rightofpublicity.com/brief-history-of-rop.
99. 4

CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES

§ 22:32 (4th

ed.).
100.
101.
102.
103.

Faber, supra note 98; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Zacchini,433 U.S. at 563-64, 578-79.
Id. at 574-75.
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013).

104. Id.
105. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).

106. Id. at 1002.
107. Hart, 717 F.3d at 154.
108. Id. at 155.
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courts have refused to apply it to right of publicity claims that do not
pertain to trademarks." 9 Notably, in both Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. and
Keller-two cases pertaining specifically to student-athletes' rights of
publicity-the courts refused to implement the Rogers test because it-goes
beyond the scope of what the Lanham Act was created to protect." 0
2. Transformative Use Test
The transformative use test was established in 2001 in California in
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc."' This is the test primarily
used for standard right of publicity cases."' The test is "a balancing test
between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether
the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or
imitation."" 3 The California Supreme Court determined that "when a work
contains significant transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy
of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the
economic interest protected by the right of publicity."14
There are five factors a court looks at to see whether the work has been
transformed enough to be protected by the First Amendment." 5 First, if
"the celebrity likeness is one of the 'raw materials' from which an original
work is synthesized," it is more likely to be transformative than if "the
depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the
work in question.""' Second, the work is protected if it is "primarily the
defendant's own expression"-as long as that expression is "something

109. Id. at 157.
110. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1280

(9th Cir. 2013) (stating that the Lanham Act and the Rogers test were implemented to
prevent the risk of consumer confusion. The right of publicity does not seek the same goals.
Rather, its main focus is to "protect[] a form of intellectual property [in one's person] that
society deems to have some social utility." (citing Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. 21
P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001))); Hart,717 F.3d at 158.
111. Comedy II Prods.Inc., 21 P.3d at 808.
112. Hart, 717 F.3d at 164-65 ("Finally, we find that of the three tests, the Transformative
Use Test is the most consistent with other courts' ad hoc approaches to right of publicity
cases.").
113. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness, 724 F.3d at 1273 (citing Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001)).
114. Comedy II Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 808.
115. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness, 724 F.3d at 1274.
116. Id. (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal.
2001)).
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other than the likeness of the celebrity."" 7 This factor requires an
examination of whether a likely purchaser's primary motivation is to buy a
reproduction of the celebrity, or to buy the expressive work of that
artist."' Third, to avoid making judgments concerning "the quality of the
artistic contribution," a court should conduct an inquiry "more quantitative
than qualitative" and ask "whether the literal and imitative or the creative
elements predominate in the work."" 9 Fourth, the California Supreme
Court indicated that "a subsidiary inquiry" would be useful in close cases:
whether "the marketability and economic value of the challenged work
derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted." ° Lastly, the court
indicated that "when an artist's skill and talent is manifestly subordinated to
the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to
commercially exploit his or her fame," the work is not transformative.'2
C. Denial of FirstAmendment Rights
In EA's video games, they allowed users to control avatars representing
college athletes and play in simulated collegiate games with those avatars.'
EA attempted to replicate each school, stadium, and player as accurately as
it could so as to make the game as realistic as possible.'23 While EA
attempted to avoid liability by leaving out players' individual names, it
produced completely accurate player jersey numbers, skin tone, hair color,
weight, height, career statistics, home states, and skill levels to the point
where each avatar was almost an exact replica of his real-life persona.'24 EA
attained all of these details by sending questionnaires to each team's
equipment managers.'25 Additionally, by using EA's online gamer database,
a user could download entire rosters from third parties containing every

117. Id.

118. Id. (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 8:72 (2d ed.
2012)).
119. Id. (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal.

2001)).
120. Id. (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal.
2001)).
121. Id.
122. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271
(9th Cir. 2013).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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players' name on the back of their jersey.'26 While EA did not specifically
create these roster downloads, EA allowed such updates to be placed on its
servers.

27

In Keller, the applicable state law in the federal diversity action was
California. 2 Although video games are entitled to full protections of the
First Amendment, such rights are not absolute when a state recognizes a
right of publicity claim.219 California right of publicity law requires a
plaintiff to prove: 1) the defendant used the plaintiffs identity; 2)
knowingly; 3) to his advantage; 4) without the plaintiffs consent; 5) causing
injury to the plaintiff; and 6) there is a direct connection between the
defendant's alleged use and the commercial purpose.'3 ° Prior to merging
into one case with O'Bannon, the NCAA, CLC, and EA filed separate
motions to dismiss in 2010.' The district court denied each of these
motions.'3 2 In denying EA's motion to dismiss, Judge Claudia Wilken held
that a video game developer's use of college athletes' likenesses in its video
games was not protected by the First Amendment, and therefore, former
college football players' right of publicity claims against developers are not
barred by California law.' 33 Judge Wilken applied the transformative use
test in administering her ruling.' 34 While EA argued that the players had no
names in the video games and were unidentifiable, Judge Wilken held that
"EA does not depict Plaintiff in a different form; he is represented as... the
starting quarterback for Arizona State University. Further ...the game's
setting is identical to where the public found Plaintiff during his collegiate
career: on the football field."' 35
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined the five transformative use
factors and affirmed Judge Wilken's ruling that EA's use of former college
athletes' likenesses in their video games is not protected by the First
Amendment. 36 The Ninth Circuit sustained the use of the transformative

126. Id.
127. Id.

128. Id. at 1278.
129. Id. at 1270-71.
130. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2010).

131. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 *1 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
132. Id. at*11.
133. Id. at *5.
134. Id. at *3-5.
135. Id. at *5.
136. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1284
(9th Cir. 2013).

2015]

AN ALL-ENCOMPASSING PRIMER

use test and rejected EA's request to implement the Rogers test.1 37
Ultimately, the rulings by the district court and the Ninth Circuit led to a
settlement by both EA and CLC with the plaintiffs.'38 The settlement was for
a total of $40 million, which was spread amongst the O'Bannon, Keller, and
Hart plaintiffs, who are discussed in detail in the next section.'39 This
particular holding by Judge Wilken had, and will continue to have,
monumental and lasting effects, not only on the video game industry, but
also on the NCAA.
D. Hart v. EA Sports
At roughly the same time that O'Bannon and Keller were initiated, Ryan
Hart, former Rutgers University quarterback from 2002-2005, also sued EA,
alleging a violation of his right of publicity in the NCAA Football video
games, much like the other two cases. 40 In Hart,the U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey actually ruled on summary judgment in favor of
EA, holding that the NCAA Football video games were protected by the
First Amendment.'4 1 On appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, the ruling was reversed.' The Third Circuit implemented the
transformative use test while rejecting the Rogers test.'43 In applying the
transformative use test, the Third Circuit found similar results to Keller,
finding that "[t]he digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan Hart did
while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations of college
football stadiums, filled with all the trappings of a college football game.
This is not transformative. .. ."" The Court ultimately determined that EA
had not sufficiently transformed the plaintiffs likeness to their own

137. Id. at 1280-82.
138. Players to Receive $40 million, ESPN (Sept. 28, 2013), http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story/jid/973 1696/ea-sports-clc-settle-lawsuits-40-million-source.
139. Id.; Travis Waldron, EA Sports Will Pay $40 Million To College Athletes For Use Of
Images In Video Games, THINK PROGRESS (June 2, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/sports
/2014/06/02/3443618/ea-sports-reaches-40-million-settement-with-college-athletes.
140. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 163.
144. Id. at 166.
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expressive work. 4 After this ruling, Hart joined the settlement EA had with
O'Bannon and Keller and dropped his suit.'46
E. EA Halts Production:A Sign of the Times
In 2010, EA discontinued its NCAA Basketball series that had achieved
147
large success at exactly the same time the O'Bannon suit originated.
Shortly after the settlement for In re Student-Athletes concluded, EA
announced it was also halting the production of its college football video
game series, NCAA Football.4 The EA series made approximately $100
million annually, and each Division I college received close to six figures
annually from their licenses with EA.'49 After settling two suits in which EA
received unfavorable rulings excluding its video games from First
Amendment protection, EA credited its decision to terminate an otherwise
extremely profitable video game directly to those suits brought by former
players. 5 ° It is safe to assume that collegiate athletics video games will be
nonexistent until a new system can be worked out that would perhaps use
player avatars not resembling those of current student-athletes, or until an
agreement is reached with college players as a whole to compensate them
for their image rights.
F. College Licensing Committee also joins Settlement
CLC, by also joining the settlement,' apparently believes that players
have a viable claim to their licensing rights on the college sports
memorabilia that CLC produces. Since CLC controls more than 80% of the
$4.6 billion in revenue created from collegiate licensed merchandise, this

145. Id.
146. Jon Solomon, EA Sports and CLC Settle Lawsuit by Ed O'Bannon Plaintiffs; NCAA
Remains as Lone Defendant, AL.COM (updated Sept. 28, 2013, 9:51 AM),
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/09/ea will not-makecoUegejfootb.html.
147. NCAA Basketball Series Officially Cancelled, PASTAPADRE (Feb. 10, 2013),
http://www.pastapadre.com/2010/02/10/ncaa-basketball-series-officialy-canceled# more-$id.
148. Cam Weber, Update on College Football, EA
http://www.ea.com/news/update-on-coUege-football.

SPORTS

(Sept.

26,

2013),

149. Jon Solomon, EA Sports NCAA Football Video Game Trademarks: Who's in, Who's
out and Who's on the Fence?, AL.coM (updated Aug. 14, 2013, 10:12 AM),
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/O8/whosinand_whos-outlicensing.html.
150. Weber, supra note 148.
151. Players to Receive $40 million, ESPN (Sept. 28, 2013), http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/9731696/ea-sports-clc-settle-lawsuits-40-million-source.
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may affect the collegiate memorabilia world as a whole. 15 2 Recently, the
NCAA has removed all memorabilia for sale on its website and made a
public statement permanently withdrawing from the collegiate athletic
memorabilia market." 3 The ongoing actions by EA, CLC, and the NCAA in
removing themselves from their respective markets concerning athletes'
naming rights signals an impending change to the way the NCAA currently
operates.
G. NCAA Petitions Supreme Court,Loses, and then Enters Settlement
Although EA had already settled its portion of the lawsuit, the NCAA
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to be heard by the Supreme Court on
behalf of their ruling against EA.' The NCAA petitioned the Supreme
Court in an effort to overturn the district and appellate court
determinations that EA's use of student-athletes' likenesses in its video
games was not protected by the First Amendment, and to convince the
Court that it should implement the Rogers test rather than the
transformative use test.' The Supreme Court denied the petition." 6 It
makes sense that the NCAA would try to appeal such a ruling because much
of its case hinges on an argument similar to EA's.
When fans enter a school store to buy a jersey, the only jerseys typically
available for sale are the team's best and most popular players. 7 These
jersey sales are indicative of the number on the jersey, and the sales are
derivative of the player's identity, not the jersey itself.' In fact, the NCAA
website underwent strict scrutiny after Jay Bilas, famous commentator and
lawyer, searched "Johnny Manziel" and several other prolific college players
by name, and even by nickname, on the NCAA website, and each time the
152. About CLC: Connecting PassionateFans to College Brands, COLLEGIATE LICENSING
Co., http://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
153. NCAA Leaves Jersey-Selling Business, Fox SPORTS (updated June 6, 2014, 3:07 PM),

http://msn.foxsports.com/ collegefootball/story/ncaa-player-jerseys-wiU-not-seU-anymoresays-president-mark-emmert-080813.
154. NCAA's Right of Publicity Petition to U.S. Supreme Court Denied,

RIGHT OF

(Jan. 17, 2014), http://rightofpublicity.com/ncaas-right-of-publicity-petition-to-us-supreme-court-denied.
PUBLICITY

155. Id.
156. Id.

157. Darren Rovell, NCAA President: No Pay for Players on Jersey Sales, CNBC (Dec. 22,
2011), www.cnbc.com/id/45768248.
158. Peter Berkes, Official NCAA Store Set Up to Profit Off Player Names, S.B.

NATION

(Aug. 6, 2013), www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/8/6/4594858/official-ncaa-storeset-up-to-profit-off-player-names; Rovell, supra note 157.
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search brought him to a page selling the correlating player's jersey.'59 Thus,
if the courts analyze merchandise sales containing a player's number, they
would likely find that the NCAA and CLC had not sufficiently transformed
the apparel from its original owner's likeness.
H. How Keller Would Have Likely Played Out in Court
Had any of the aforementioned cases concerning student-athletes' image
rights actually proceeded to trial, it would be a closely contested case likely
hinging on the issue of consent and the NCAA scholarship contracts. The
following sections include the elements of the right of publicity claim as
applied to Keller, as if the case had actually gone to trial but using the
elements from the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.
1. Use of the Plaintiffs Name, Likeness, or Other Indicia of Identity
The right of publicity was established to protect one's public reputation
or persona. 6 ' Thus, the scope of one's identity extends beyond their name
or image to also include "those representations which are recognizable as
likenesses of the complaining individual." 6 ' One's identity can include their
' among
"name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness, in any manner,"162
other things, as long as it is a characteristic that is distinct to the plaintiff.'63
Thus, student-athletes' jerseys or avatars in video games are very likely to be
considered an extension of their identity as well. While right of publicity
claims once only protected a celebrity's identity, most states now extend
them to the protection of any individual's commercial identity, and simply
use their fame as a measurement for how to allocate damages. 6
2. Student-Athletes' Identity
Student-athletes are identifiable by thousands-and in the case of the
superstars, by millions-of fans simply by their faces. Players are
recognized by their jersey numbers, accessories, and playing style, among
other things. All such facets of their identity were being utilized in the sale
159.
160.
161.
162.
identity
163.

Id.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that one's
can even include "signs or symbols associated" with a person).
Id. at 463-64 (showing the distinction of one's voice as part of their identity);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995).
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723,729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

§

46, cmt. d (1995); Ali v. Playgirl,
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of their jerseys by the NCAA and the CLC, and by the use of their avatars in
EA's video games.'65 Despite no name existing on the back of a jersey sold
or on the avatar used in a video game, fans can identify their favorite player
from their number alone. 166 It is an extension of the individual. Numbers
are placed on jerseys to help fans, coaches, and referees alike identify an
individual on their field of play. Since there is typically only one player on
each team that wears a certain number, when a person buys that jersey
number or plays with that avatar in the video game, they associate the
player's number on his specific team with the real life individual. When a
player is traded in the professional leagues, it is common practice for a more
established star to pay a large sum of money to the player on the new team
that already has the rights to his number. 167 This is because an athlete's
jersey number is more than just a number; it becomes part of the athlete's
personal brand. 68 Michael Jordan has made billions selling his brand "Air
Jordan" with each sneaker typically having the insignia "23" placed
somewhere on it.' 69 Such brand loyalty and association shows that student-

athletes' numbers are an extension of their likeness.
Couple that with EA's use of not only student-athletes' numbers but
home states, attributes, skin tone, and year in school, 7 ' and there is no
doubt that the NCAA, EA, and CLC all profit off of the identity of the
student-athlete. The feature in EA's NCAA Footballvideo games that allows
all player names to be downloaded from a server would allow each and
every plaintiff to easily prove the misappropriation of their identity in the
video game simply by introducing such a feature into evidence.'
165. Berkes, supra note 158; Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL

530108, *1 (N.D. Cal. 2010), affd sub nom., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
166. Wong, supra note 43, at 1082 n.105.

167. Lee Jenkins, What is a Number Worth? Some Athletes Pay the Price,N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com200S/05/13/sports/13numbers.html?pagewanted=print&_r=O
(showing players paying up to $40,000 for the rights to a number; the Washington Redskins

Clinton Portis was once sued for not completing payments for the rights to his number).
168. Id. "'If you play long enough,' Glavine said, 'that number becomes your identity.'
For many professional athletes, a jersey number is a personal brand. It is worn on shoes and
helmets, wristbands and turtlenecks. It inspires tattoos and is engraved on medallions ...

Id.
169. Kyle Newport, Nike Made $2.25 Billion Off Jordan Brand in 2013, BLEACHER REP.
(Feb. 6, 2014),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1951107-nike-made-225-billion-offjordan-brand-in-2013.
170. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271
(9th. Cir. 2013).
171. Id.
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Additional proof that a number is an extension of a student-athlete's
identity is the fact that when a customer searched the NCAA website for a
specific player, i.e. Johnny Manziel, the search would lead the customer to a
page selling the student-athletes exact jersey with his real number.'7 2
Clearly, even the NCAA views a player's number on his jersey as an
extension of his identity.
3. Appropriation of the Commercial Value of Plaintiffs Identity
The next element that student-athletes must prove is that the defendant
appropriated his image or likeness for commercial gain. 7 3 "One may be
liable for 'appropriation' if he pirate(s) the plaintiffs identity for some
advantage of his own."'74 Proving that one's likeness has been appropriated
requires showing "harm to both personal and commercial interests caused
by an unauthorized exploitation of the plaintiffs identity."'7 5 As long as the
plaintiffs show that their name had actual value prior to the infringement of
76
their right of publicity, then they will prevail on this element.'
The millions of dollars EA has made annually from its NCAA Football
78
releases,' 77 the $4.6 billion collegiate merchandise market CLC controls,'
and the almost $11 billion broadcasting agreement the NCAA agreed to
with CBS,' 79 were all at the expense of thousands of student-athletes who
received none of that actual revenue despite creating the intrinsic value in
each case. This is sufficient to show not only that these three organizations
were profiting off of the student-athletes' likenesses, but also that actual
harm occurred to the student-athletes, fulfilling the third element. The
student-athletes could establish the value of their identity by expert
witnesses conducting research as to the value added by using real players'
172. Laken Litman, NCAA was Selling Specific Athlete Apparel, Then the Internet Got Up
in Arms About It, USATODAY (Aug. 6, 2013), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2013/08/how-to-buy-

official-player-jerseys-from-the-ncaa/.
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
174. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571 n.7 (1977).
175.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §

46 cmt. b (1995).

176. Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198-99 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
177. Solomon, supra note 149.
178. About CLC: Connecting Passionate Fans to College Brands, COLLEGIATE LICENSING
Co., http://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
179. Time Warner Joins CBS in $10.8 Billion March Madness TV Deal, Fox BUSINESS
(Apr. 22,2010),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2010/04/22/time-warner-joins-cbs-billion-marchmadness-tv-deal/.
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avatars in the video games, or introducing the NCAA website link that
brought up certain players' jerseys for sale if one entered that player's name
in the search bar.' The price of each jersey could symbolize the player's
value created through his number.
4. Without Consent
Any behavior that otherwise infringes on a plaintiffs right of publicity is
permissible if the defendant has obtained the plaintiffs informed consent.'
The defendant is limited, however, to the scope of the consent given to him
by the plaintiff.'82 Any conduct outside the scope of the consent granted for
use of the plaintiffs identity will subject the defendant to liability.'83
The best remaining defense that the NCAA, CLC, and EA would have in
this lawsuit is that the student-athletes consented to the NCAA's use of
their names, images, and likenesses. This is the best remaining defense
because the courts previously held that the defendants in this lawsuit are
not protected under the First Amendment,8 4 although the legal standard
was based on a motion to dismiss, which provides much more deference to
the plaintiffs.' 85 The NCAA would point to the National Letter of Intent, the
Statement of Financial Aid, and NCAA Form 08-3a as evidence of the
consent of every student-athlete.'86 Each agreement incorporates the NCAA
Bylaws, including their amateurism rules; and each requires a signature
from the student-athlete. 7 The incorporated NCAA Bylaws, specifically

180. Litman, supra note 172; Berkes, supra note 158.
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995).
182. Id. at § 46 cmt. f.
183. Id.
184. See discussion supra Part V.C.
185. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010), affd sub nom., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724
F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) ("In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a
claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff." (citation omitted)).
186. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL
1642256, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see Anastasios Kaburakis et al., NCAA Student-Athletes'
Rights of Publicity, Ea Sports, and the Video Game Industry, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 18
(2009).
187. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL
1642256, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Sean M. Hanlon, Athletic Scholarships As Unconscionable
Contracts of Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 41, 63 (2006); see
NCAA Form 08-3a, supra note 45.
The conditions that you must meet to be eligible and the requirement that you
sign this form are indicated in the following bylaws of the Division I Manual:
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section 12.5.2.1, state that a student-athlete becomes ineligible for
participation if he profits financially off of his image or likeness.'88
Additionally, each of the aforementioned documents, either expressly or
through incorporation, includes language similar to the following: "[t]he
NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institution,
conference, local organizing committee)] may use the name or picture of an
enrolled student-athlete to generally promote NCAA championships or
other NCAA events, activities or programs."8 9 Should a court find that such
language does in fact convey student-athletes' image rights completely to
the NCAA, including for commercial purposes, then the student-athlete
would forfeit all of his image rights upon signing the required contracts,
and the NCAA would have complete, unfettered control of all studentathletes' rights of publicity. The NCAA merely has to introduce the studentathletes' signatures as evidence of their consent. Nevertheless, this defense
may have its flaws.
The student-athlete's best counteraction to the NCAA's affirmative
defense of consent is to argue: 1) that the NCAA's licensing of studentathletes' likenesses is outside the student-athletes' scope of consent, and
thus, the NCAA's licenses constitute a breach of contract; 2) that the
ambiguity of the forms student-athletes sign must be construed against the
NCAA; and 3) that the forms the NCAA forces student-athletes to comply
with create an unconscionable adhesion contract.
While the student-athletes consented to the forfeiture of any commercial
gain from their right of publicity and allowed the NCAA to use it for the
promotion of "NCAA championships..

.

19
events, activities, or programs,""

the student-athletes never intended to grant the NCAA consent to utilize

o
o

Bylaws 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16
Bylaws 14.1.3.1, 18.4 and 31.2.3

You affirm that your institution has provided you a copy of the Summary of
NCAA Regulations or the relevant sections of the Division I Manual and that
your director of athletics (or his or her designee) gave you the opportunity to
ask questions about them. You affirm that you meet the NCAA regulations for
student-athletes regarding eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, amateur status

and involvement in gambling activities.
Id.
188. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.5.2.1.
189. See id. at art. 12.5.1.1.1; NCAA Form 08-3a, supra note 45; National Letter of Intent,
NCAA

ELIGIBILITY

CENTER

(Oct.

13,

2014),

http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/CNBC

/Sections/NewsAndAnalysis/-StoryInserts/graphics/-PDF/NLI_2010_201 1.pdf.
190. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.5.1.1.1; see Hanlon, supra note 187, at 63.
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their likenesses for profit. 9' While the licensing of players' likenesses to EA
and the CLC has in fact promoted NCAA athletics as a whole, the NCAA
Bylaws were not intended to allow others to profit off of student-athletes in
such a way.9 2 In fact, one of the primary purposes of the NCAA Bylaws is
its "Commitment to Amateurism."' Part of the definition of the "Principle
of Amateurism" in the NCAA Bylaws is to protect student-athletes "from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises."194
Additionally, the use of student-athletes' likenesses for profit by EA,
NCAA, and the CLC, directly conflicts with NCAA Bylaw 12.5.2.1.2, which
prohibits the "use of [a] student-athlete's name or picture [by an
institution] in a manner contrary to Bylaw 12.5.2.1."' 9 Bylaw 12.5.1.1
authorizes the use of players' images by the NCAA, or a third party acting
on behalf of the NCAA, and then lists examples of third parties, such as
host institutions, non-profits, conferences, or local organizing
committees. 9 6 None of the third party examples listed is a for-profit
organization intending to utilize the players' likenesses for commercial
gain. 197 Instead, they are all NCAA-affiliated organizations with the ultimate
goal of serving the NCAA's mission of "amateurism.' '9 Had the NCAA
intended for third party corporations to be able to profit off of players'
likenesses, they would have included a section in the bylaws enabling such a
use and not created a principle provision declaring, "student-athletes
should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises." 99
By consenting to the NCAA's use of their likenesses for promotion of
NCAA events, programs, and activities, student-athletes consented only to
use of their likenesses for non-commercially related endeavors enhancing
the NCAA's reputation; it was generally understood that student-athletes'
191. Kaburakis, supra note 186, at 25-26 ("Although there are ... express waivers
regulated in the NCAA Manual (e.g., FERPA, HIPAA, and drug-testing releases), there are
none for [student-athletes'] intellectual property rights other than what is extended from
Bylaw 12.5.").
192. See NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 2.9.
193. Id. at xiv ("The Commitment to Amateurism.").
194. Id. at art. 2.9.
195. Id. at art. 12.5.2.1.2. NCAA Bylaw 12.5.2.1, mentioned in art. 12.5.2.1.2, prohibits a
student-athlete from the use or endorsement of his name or picture for commercial
purposes. See supra text accompanying note 48.
196. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.5.1.1.
197. Id.
198. Id. at art. 12.5.1.1, art. 2.9.
199. Id. at art. 2.9.
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likenesses would never be used by any third party for commercial gain as
evidenced by the above bylaws. 200 Nowhere in the NCAA Bylaws does it
provide for the use of players' images in video games or media. 20 1 Thus, by
granting licenses to CLC and EA, the NCAA directly violated the scope of
consent contracted for with the student-athletes, which also constitutes a
breach of contract.2 2
"In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement
or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds."20 3 A provision is ambiguous if its language "is subject to two or
more reasonable interpretations."' 204 It is standard practice in almost every

court of law that ambiguous contractual terms are to be construed against
the party who drafted the agreement.20 1 "The rule is often invoked in cases
of standardized contracts and in cases where the drafting party has the
20
6
stronger bargaining position ....
The student-athletes' right of publicity suit would be centered around the
meaning of the. NCAA Bylaws and the provisions of the contractual forms
constituting a scholarship, particularly the following:
Promotions Involving NCAA Championships, Events, Activities
or Programs[:] The NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of
the NCAA (e.g., host institution, conference, local organizing
committee)] may use the name or picture of an enrolled studentathlete to generally promote NCAA championships or other
27
NCAA events, activities or programs.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 192-99.
201. See generally NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37; see also Kaburakis, supra note 186, at 25-

26.
202. See Pattern Inst. Kan. Civil 124.01-A; Vernon's Okla. Forms 2d, OUJI-CIV 23.1
(2012 ed.).
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS §

206 (1981).

204. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex.
1995).
205. See Town of Smyrna v. Mun. Gas Auth. of Ga., 723 F.3d 640, 646 (6th Cir. 2013);
Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Orient Overseas Container Line Ltd., 525 F.3d 409, 423 (6th Cir.
2008); Shay v. Aldrich, 790 N.W.2d 629, 644 (Mich. 2010); Klapp v. United Ins. Grp. Agency,
Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Mich. 2003).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (1981). "It is in strictness a rule
of legal effect, sometimes called construction, as well as interpretation: its operation depends
on the positions of the parties as they appear in litigation, and sometimes the result is hard to
distinguish from a denial of effect to an unconscionable clause." Id.
207. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art.12.5.1.1.1.
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Should NCAA Bylaw 12.5.1.1.1, and the similar provision in NCAA
Form 08-3a, be interpreted to indicate that the student-athletes consented
to any use of their image rights by the NCAA, not just for non-commercial
uses as could be interpreted from the provision, then it defeats any right of
publicity claim brought against the NCAA and its licensees.2"' Since two
reasonable interpretations of this provision exist as to whether studentathletes have consented to any use of their likeness or to just a limited
scope, the provision is ambiguous.0 9 Additionally, since the NCAA clearly
has the one-sided bargaining position for this contract,2"0 the court will
likely weigh such a factor against the NCAA even further. This provision,
along with several others,211 thus requires the courts to interpret the
language against the drafter, in this case, the NCAA and the member
schools.

212

If the courts find that the NCAA Bylaws actually allow the NCAA to
license student-athletes' likenesses to for-profit third parties, then the
student-athletes must proceed with their last defense-unconscionability.
Unconscionability is one of the few defenses to a valid contract where
consent was given from both sides. "Traditionally, a bargain was said to be
unconscionable ...

if it was 'such as no man in his senses and not under

delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other .... ,,,213 A party may void a contract due to its
unconscionability, but it first must prove two elements: 1) procedural
unconscionability and 2) substantive unconscionability.214 "Courts should
apply a sliding scale in making this determination: the more substantively
of
evidence
the
less
term,
contract
the
oppressive

208. See supra text accompanying notes 192-199.
209. Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2000).
210. The NCAA is an association of 1,281 different educational institutions, conferences,
and organizations regulating over 450,000 collegiate athletes at one time. Who We Are,
NCAA (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are. The student-athletes signing
the forms are sometimes as young as sixteen years old. Amobi Okoye Player Profile,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/players/draft/436548.
211. See discussion supra Part III.B.
212. See generally NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37; see also NCAA Form 08-3a, supra note
45.
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (quoting Hume v. United
States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889)).
214. Wattenbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 246 P.3d 961,974 (Idaho 2010).
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procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the
215
clause is unenforceable, and vice versa."
"Procedural unconscionability concerns the bargaining process leading
to the formation of a contract." 216 Procedural unconscionability focuses on
instances of oppression in the negotiation or formation of a contract. 217 It
examines unequal bargaining positions, lack of voluntariness, nonnegotiability of the stronger party's terms, use of ambiguous words, and the
inability to contract with another party.218 It results from inequities or
unfairness of a "contract term [that] is so one-sided that it has an overly
219
harsh effect on the disadvantaged party."
While it has already been determined that an NCAA scholarship
constitutes a contract in the courts of law,220 student-athletes are not really
afforded breach of contract or other contractual claims because the entire
agreement consists of NCAA restrictions on the student-athletes; it does
not really place any obligatory conditions on the NCAA except that they
honor a student-athlete's scholarship should he comply with all the NCAA
regulations. 22 NCAA scholarships clearly equate to an adhesion contract
because they are standard form contracts that cannot be negotiated and are
provided in a "take-it-or-leave-it" manner.2 22 Should the student-athlete
choose not to consent to all NCAA bylaws and restrictions, including
granting his right of publicity to the NCAA, then he cannot compete at any
NCAA institution, from Divisions I, II, or 111.223 The only other significant,
215. Grayiel v. Appalachian Energy Partners 2001-D, LLP, 736 S.E.2d 91, 102 (W. Va.
2012).
216. Wattenbarger,246 P.3d at 974.
217. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).
218. Wattenbarger,246 P.3d at 974.
219. Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737 S.E.2d 550, 558 (W. Va. 2012).
220. Hanlon, supra note 187, at 61 (stating courts have recognized the National Letter of
Intent and the Statement of Financial Aid as the two main documents that form a contract
between the student-athlete and the university or college). The courts have also identified
other documents, such as recruitment letters and university bulletins and catalogues, as part
of the contract. Id.; see Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. 1972).
221. National Letter of Intent, NCAA ELIGIBILITY CENTER (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/CNBC/Sections/News AndAnalysisLStoryInserts/graphics/
_PDF/NLI_2010_201 1.pdf; Hanlon, supra note 187, at 73.
222. National Letter of Intent,

NCAA

ELIGIBILITY

CENTER

(Oct.

13,

2014),

http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/CNBC/Sections/News -AndAnalysis/-Storyjnserts/graphi
cs/PDF/NLI_2010_2011.pdf; see also Hanlon, supra note 187, at 71.
223. NCAA

College

Athletics

Statistics,

STATISTIC

BRAIN

(Oct.

13,

2014),

http://www.statisticbrain.com/ncaa-coUege-athletics-statistics/.
There are 120 NCAA
Football Bowl Subdivision (formerly known as Division 1-A) schools, 125 Football
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organized collegiate athletic association aside from the NCAA that a
student-athlete could choose to participate in is the National Association of
Intercollegiate Athletics ("NAIA"). 224 The NAIA represents only eighty-nine
member schools that have a football team, and very few of these schools
actually offer full scholarships to their athletes. 2

5

While the NAIA has

significantly fewer restrictions than the NCAA, the fact is, very few players
actually play professionally after leaving a school that was a part of the
NAIA and the schools get very little publicity and attendance compared to
NCAA schools.226 Thus, the best high school athletes in the country
essentially have one choice, consent to the NCAA's restrictions, including
the waiver of the right of publicity, or become irrelevant in the college
athletics world and have very little chance of attaining any professional
dreams.
The NCAA controls all of the bargaining power, which results in
oppressive, one-sided "negotiations" that ultimately lead to the studentathlete agreeing to a coercive contract with no viable alternative. These
take-it-or-leave-it contracts arguably meet all of the factors examined in
order to satisfy procedural unconscionability.
Championship Subdivision (formerly known as Division 1-AA) schools, 149 Division II
schools, and 236 Division III schools with football programs. Id.
224. 2014-15 NAIA Football, NAIA (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.naia.org/
ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=205323224.
225. NAIA Scholarships, SCHOLARSHIPS.COM (Oct. 13, 2014), https://www.scholarships.com
/financial-aid/college-scholarships/sports-scholarships/naia-scholarships.
226. See What Is the Difference Between the NCAA, NAIA, and NICAA?, SPORTS
RECRUITING
(Oct.
13,
2014),
http://www.sportsrecruitingusa.comincaa-naianjcaa/4574871702; Difference Between NCAA and NAIA, DIFFERENcEBETWEEN.NET (Oct. 13,
2014), http://www.differencebetween.net/miscellaneous/difference-between-ncaa-and-naia/;
Jeremy Cabler, Ray Ray Armstrong Looks to Restore His Draft Stock in the NAIA,
RANTSPORTS.COM (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.rantsports.com/ncaa-football/2012/08/14/rayray-armstrong-looks-to-restore-his-draft-stock-in-the-naia ("Now NAIA schools will put
out NFL talent every now and then. Recently Danny Woodhead, Patrick Crayton,
and Derrick Ward have all came [sic] from those ranks and have found success in the NFL,
but the prospects of most NAIA football players getting drafted are bleak."); see also Alan
Grosbach,
Russell
Athletic-NAIA
Football Championship Preview, NAIA,
http://www.naia.org /ViewArticle.dbmlATCLID=205824160 (last visited Oct. 13, 2014)
("The average attendance in the last four years [at the NAIA football championship] has
been 5,854 fans. The highest attendance of 6,500 occurred in the 2008 event when Carroll
(Mont.) and Sioux Falls (S.D.) squared off for the second-straight season."). In comparison,
in the Football Bowl Subdivision alone, average attendance for each game was 45,671, and
three separate programs averaged attendance over 100,000 fans per game. All-Division
Attendance Mark Sets Records; Total Figure Tops 50 Million, NCAA (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article /2014-02-03/all-division-attendance-mark-setsrecords-total-figure-tops-50. Ultimately, the two conferences do not compare.
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The other aspect of unconscionability is substantive unconscionability.
"Substantive unconscionability focuses on the contract's terms.

'227

The

substantive aspect refers to overly harsh or one-sided results that benefit the
drafting party at the other party's expense.228 Substantive unconscionability
deals with terms "that impair the integrity of the bargaining process or
otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy; terms (usually of
an adhesion or boilerplate nature) that attempt to alter in an impermissible
manner fundamental duties otherwise imposed by the law.

'229

Factors a

court examines to determine substantive unconscionability include the
"commercial reasonableness of the contract terms, the purpose and effect
of
the terms, the allocation of the risks between the parties, and public policy
230
concerns."
In terms of the substantive unconscionability element, much of the
student-athletes' arguments will rely on public policy; and the current
public consensus favors student-athletes. With Congress, 23 1 state
legislatures, 212 professional athletes,233 celebrities,3 . and even courts, 235 all
227. 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed.).
228. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011); see 8 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed.).
229. 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed.).
230. Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson, 737. S.E.2d 550, 552 (W. Va. 2012). Other courts
have a ten-factor test that must be analyzed in order to rule on the substantive
unconscionability element. See Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976);
Broadway v. Household Fin. Corp. of Huntsville, 351 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
231. Recently, a congressional bill was introduced signaling an attempt by Congress to
amend the NCAA Bylaws. Jon Solomon, Introducing the NCAA Accountability Act: Two
Members of Congress Propose Bipartisan Bill, AL.cOM
(Aug.
1, 2013),
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/08/introducingjthe-ncaaaccountab.html. The bill
seeks to prevent universities from implementing a policy that prohibits paying stipends to
their student-athletes. Id.
232. California has proposed a bill that would allow all California schools to offer full
cost-of-attendance scholarships. Mit Winter, Will California Mandate Cost of Attendance
Scholarships
and
Stipends?,
Bus..
COLL.
SPORTS
(Aug.
22,
2013),

http://businessofcoUegesports.com/2013/08/22/will-california-mandate-cost-of-attendancescholarships-and-stipends/. It would also set a stipend of $3,600 to be paid in addition to the
cost-of-attendance scholarship. Id.
233. Arian Foster, running back for the Houston Texans, spoke in a documentary about how
he came home after a game and had no food despite just winning a game for the University of
Tennessee. Brian T. Smith, Texans' Arian Foster Opens Up About Pay-for-Play, Calls NCAA
Bullies, CHRON (Sept. 20, 2013), http://blog.chron.com/ultimatetexans/2013/09/texans-arianfoster-opens-up-about-pay-for-play-calls-ncaa-bullies/#15770103=0&16147101=0.
Shabazz
Napier, a professional basketball player for the Miami Heat, after winning the national
championship for the University of Connecticut, complained of going to bed hungry. Justin
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lending support to the student-athletes in some way, it may be the public
policy factor that puts this litigation over the top. However, examining the
other factors also leans favorably to the student-athletes. While the purpose
and effect of the NCAA were once to protect the concept of education and
amateurism, today those lines have become blurred. With the NCAA, a
non-profit institution, now generating billions of dollars in revenue, all of
which is derived from the student-athletes without allowing them any
additional compensation beyond their scholarships, the motive of the
NCAA seems to have shifted towards economic gain for itself and its
member institutions. 36 Thus, the NCAA's purpose is no longer clear; the
effect its bylaws currently have would likely be construed against the NCAA
by a court.237
Additionally, all of the risk involved in the contract is allocated to the
student-athletes. One violation of the plethora of restrictions instituted by
the NCAA can cause a student-athlete to forfeit his entire scholarship.238
Compare that with the risk taken on by the school in entering into the
National Letter of Intent with the student-athlete: "The terms of this NLI
shall be satisfied if [the student-athlete] attend[s] the institution named in
this document for one academic year (two semesters or three quarters) as a
full-time student. ''23 9 Essentially, the NCAA school must honor only one
year of a student-athlete's scholarship. Even the NCAA's sole term in the
bargain is contingent on the fact that the student-athlete abides by the
NCAA Bylaws and maintains his eligibility.24 °
The commercial reasonableness of the terms weighs largely against the
student-athletes as the billions generated in revenue by the student-athletes
are largely disproportionate to the $20,000-40,000 student-athletes are
awarded annually in scholarships.24 ' By preventing student-athletes from
profiting off of their right of publicity, and essentially granting this right to
Baragona, Ion Stewart Annihilates the NCAA's Argument Against Student-Athlete's Unionizing,
POLITICS

USA (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.politicususa.com/2014/04/l 1/jon-stewart-annihilates-

ncaas-argument-student-athletes-unionizing.htmil.
234. Baragona, supra note 233.

235. See discussion supra Part V; see discussion infra Part VI.
236. See discussion supra Parts I.B, III.C.
237. Id.
238. National Letter of Intent, NCAA EUGIBILITY CENTER § 7 (Oct. 13, 2014),
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/CNBC/Sections/NewsAndAnalysis/-Story-Inserts/graphics/
_PDF/NLI_2010_2011.pdf.
239. Id.
240. Id.

241. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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the NCAA, the terms of the adhesion contract may become such that "no
man in his senses and not under delusion would make. '241 Potentially
famous student-athletes forego millions of dollars when they choose to play
with the NCAA, but they have no other viable option when it comes to
obtaining an education.243 Beyond the forfeiture of their right of publicity,
famous student-athletes forfeit potentially millions of dollars in other areas
as well by being forced to play in the NCAA.2" However, because very few
student-athletes actually have valuable image rights and actually become
professionals in their sport, the schools also take on significant risk in
offering so many scholarships each year. While they are all contributing to
the final product on the court or field, many players, by themselves, are
barely worth the scholarship itself in monetary value. Thus, it is for the
courts to determine whether a reasonable person would enter into such an
adhesion contract unless they were coerced.
An adhesion contract is a standard form contract administered by one
party to another party who has little to no control over its terms.24
242. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406,406 (1889) ("Courts of law will always refuse to
enforce such a bargain, as against the public policy of honesty, fair dealing, and good
morals.").
243. See discussion supra Part V.H.4. While basketball players can play professionally
overseas instead of the NCAA and make a decent salary, football players do not have any
other league to play in where they can make comparable money. The Canadian Football
League is the only other option, but they restrict the amount of foreign players allowed on
each team. Darren Heitner, NBA D-League vs. European Basketball: Why Don't More Players
Go

to

Europe?,

SPORTS

AGENT

BLOG

(July

30,

2013),

http://sportsagentblog.com/2012/07/30/nba-d-league-vs-european-basketbal-why-dontmore -players-go-to-europe/;
CANADIAN
FOOTBALL
LEAGUE,
http://www.cfl.ca/page/game-rule-ratio; see also text accompanying infra note 244.
244. Student-athletes are required to meet a minimum age requirement before entering both
the NFL and the NBA. By forcing student-athletes to not only go to college but also to stay a
number of years, they risk the millions that they could have earned by turning professional right
out of high school. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);

see Gordon Monson, Monson: NFL and NBA Minimum Age Rules Discriminate,and Should Be
Changed, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Oct. 13, 2014) http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/sports/55887465-

77/college-players-nfl-nba.html.csp; Clay Travis, MarcusLattimore Out ForSeason: Is NFL's Age
Restriction a Moral Issue?, Fox SPORTS (Oct. 13, 2014), http://msn.foxsports.com/college-

footbal/outkick-the-coverage/marcus-lattimore-out-for-season-is-nfls-age-restriction-a-moralissue.php; Grant Hughes, Why the NBA's 1-and-Done Rule Is CausingMore Harm Than Good,
BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 13, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1723163-why-the-nbas-one-

and-done-rule-is-causing-more-harm-than-good. Student-athletes also are extremely regulated
as to where and how many hours they can work while in school. Craig T. Greenlee, StudentAthletes at Work NCAA Work Rule Will be 'Difficult to Monitor.'-NationalCollegiateAthletic
Association, DIVERSEEDUCATION.COM (Oct. 13, 2014), http://diverseeducation.com/artide/7463.

245. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 366 (9th ed. 2009).

2015]

AN ALL-ENCOMPASSING PRIMER

Typically, the party administering the adhesion contract has lopsided
bargaining power over the recipient of the contract. 46 It usually consists of a
take-it-or-leave-it proposal by the stronger party where the weaker party
can either accept the contract or look elsewhere.247 There are several reasons
why courts sometimes look unfavorably on these types of contracts:
First, the party that proffers the form has had the advantage of
time and expert advice in preparing it, almost inevitably
producing a form slanted in its favor. Second, the other party is
usually completely or at least relatively unfamiliar with the form
and has scant opportunity to read it-an opportunity often
diminished by the use of fine print and convoluted clauses.
Third, bargaining over terms of the form may not be between
equals or, as is more often the case, there may be no possibility of
bargaining at all. The form may be used by an enterprise with
such disproportionately strong economic power that it simply
dictates the terms.248
An adhesion contract is not unconscionable per se simply because it has
unfavorable terms and one party maintains more bargaining power than the
other.249 Rather, courts see an adhesion contract as evidence of procedural
unconscionability, but still require sufficient evidence proving the
substantive unconscionability element of the claim.25 ° Here, the studentathletes could make a showing that the NCAA forms are an adhesion
contract because the NCAA is the severely advantaged party who drafted
the document and has used it and amended it for years; student-athletes
typically are too young to realize what all of the terms mean, and studentathletes cannot bargain on any of the terms but are forced to accept them as
is. At the same time, the NCAA already invests up to $50,000 in each
student-athlete each year and a handful of student-athletes are awarded
more in their scholarship than the value they provide to the university.
Should the Keller case have proceeded to court, the student-athletes had
strong support for winning the case, but it would not have been an easy
argument. The wording of Judge Wilken's ruling in O'Bannon lends some
insight into how she would have determined many similar issues in Keller.

246. Id.

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Brian Welch, Unconscionable Amateurism: How the NCAA Violates Antitrust by
ForcingAthletes to Sign Away Their Image Rights, 44 J.MARSHALL L. REv. 533, 543 (2011).
250. Id.
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VI. ANTITRUST SUMMARY AND THE O'BANNON RULING
The next focus of this Comment is to analyze the claims made in

O'Bannon, delineate the results of the federal district court's ruling, and
examine their applicability to the current NCAA system.
To successfully establish a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, the plaintiffs must first establish that a conspiracy, contract,
or other agreement exists that imposes an unreasonable restraint of trade
" ' By showing
affecting interstate commerce.25
that the NCAA was a
hierarchical organization run by its members, grouped into conferences,
and in accordance with the NCAA Division I Bylaws, the O'Bannon
plaintiffs proved the conspiracy element.2" 2 The NCAA did not dispute that
such an agreement existed nor did they dispute that the agreement affects
interstate commerce; they only refuted that such restraint on trade was
unreasonable.2" 3
A. The ChallengedRestraint and the Rule of Reason Analysis
After showing an agreement exists that affects interstate commerce,
antitrust plaintiffs have to show that the agreement unreasonably restrained
trade in a relevant market.2 4 Judge Wilken utilized a balancing test to
determine reasonableness, otherwise known as the rule of reason analysis.255
"A restraint violates the rule of reason if the restraint's harm to the
competition outweighs its procompetitive effects."256 "[T]he plaintiff bears
the initial burden of showing that the restraint produces 'significant
anticompetitive effects' within 'a relevant market."'2 7 If sufficiently proven,
the burden then shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of
procompetitive justifications.258 If the defendant is then able to prove
procompetitive justifications, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
prove less restrictive means are available to the current restraint.2 9
The O'Bannon plaintiffs' theory of the entire case was that the NCAA
prohibited "current student-athletes from receiving any compensation from
251. O'Bannon v. 'Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2014-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ! 78865,
2014 WL 3899815, "18 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001).
257. Id. (internal citation omitted).
258. Id.
259. Id.
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their schools or outside sources for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses in live game telecasts, video games, game re-broadcasts,
advertisements, and other footage," and that such rules restrained trade on
the group licensing and college education markets.2 6
1. Anticompetitive Effects Against the Relevant Market
In past antitrust cases against the NCAA, the Supreme Court has found
that relevant markets did not exist because the market that they were
claiming was restricted was linked to an educational program, e.g. the
NCAA, and thus there was no connection to commercial activities.26' Judge
Wilken defined a relevant market as the following:
[A relevant market] encompasses notions of geography as well as
product use, quality, and description. The geographic market
extends to the area of effective competition.., where buyers can
turn for alternative sources of supply. The product market
includes the pool of goods or services that enjoy reasonable
interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand. 62
In O'Bannon, the plaintiffs alleged that the agreements caused
anticompetitive effects in two relevant markets: 1) the college education
market, where colleges compete to recruit student-athletes to play Football
Bowl Subdivision ("FBS") football (formerly Division I-A) and Division I
basketball; and 2) the group licensing market, where video game developers,
television networks, and third parties fight to be granted the group license
26
rights for the FBS football players and Division I basketball players. 1
a.

College education market

Judge Wilken held that the plaintiffs established the college education
market as a relevant market because of the unique bundle of goods and
services each school competed to sell to each athlete. 2' Each school offered
to pay prospective athletes' college education in exchange for participation
on their football or basketball team and their grant of their name, image,
and likenesses to the school. 25 The most that any school can give each of
260. Id. at *7.
261. See Jones v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975)
(citing Kors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959)).
262. O'Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *19 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d
1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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these players is limited to the grant-in-aid scholarship afforded them by
NCAA rules.26 6 While the NCAA and its member schools argued that the
students' market was not restrained because they could play professionally
at the Football Championship Subdivision ("FCS"), Division II, III, NAIA,
or NCAA level, Judge Wilken claimed that none of those leagues offered
similar products and opportunities.26 7 She stated that "[t]o determine
whether a product has economic substitutes, courts typically consider two
factors: 'first, [the product's] reasonable interchangeability for the same or
similar uses; and second, cross-elasticity of demand, an economic term
describing the responsiveness of sales of one product to price changes in
another.' 268 In determining the interchangeability of markets, one must
examine the price, use, and qualities of all potential substitutes.269
Since most of the other divisions that the NCAA alleged that potential
student-athletes could attend did not offer the same amount of money in
scholarships as FBS football and Division I basketball, they were not
considered interchangeable markets.27 ° Neither were the professional sports
leagues, such as the NBA Developmental League or the foreign professional
leagues, since neither could provide higher education or national
exposure.27 Judge Wilken cited the plaintiffs' evidence that student-athletes
chose FBS football or Division I basketball more than 98% of the time for
those same reasons.272 Thus, she ruled that the college education market was
a distinct market.273
Since the relevant market was established, the O'Bannon plaintiffs then
had to show evidence supporting that there was a challenged restraint
causing anticompetitive effects within that market.2 74 The plaintiffs pointed
to the NCAA's strict limits permitting student-athletes to receive
scholarships equivalent to the value of "full grant-in-aid" as an anticompetitive effect.2 75 Their argument rested on the fact that under the
current NCAA Bylaws, if any school seeks to pay any player an amount

266. Id.

267. Id. at *20.
268. Id. (quoting L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381,
1393 (9th Cir. 1984)).
269. Id.

270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *20.

274. Id. at *19.
275.

Id. at *21.
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above the NCAA's limit of "full grant-in-aid," that school is subject to
sanctions by the NCAA. 276 The plaintiffs established that full "grant-in-aid"
only covers "tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related "
textbooks," but often does not cover the full "cost of attendance of
school." 277 By doing so, Judge Wilken determined that the NCAA also
undervalues the student-athletes' name, image, and likeness rights even
though the NCAA does not place a specific monetary limit on those
rights. 278 Judge Wilken compared this implicit price-fixing agreement of
players' name, image and likeness rights to Major League Baseball
Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. where Justice Sotomayor's concurring
opinion said that antitrust plaintiffs could meet their burden of proving
anticompetitive restraints of trade through an agreement to fix prices
"indirectly" even though no explicit monetary price was set on the
agreement.279
The plaintiffs' star witness, economic expert Dr. Roger Noll, testified that
if the grant-in-aid limit or the total financial aid limit were higher, schools
could compete for the best recruits by offering them larger scholarships,
thus, curtailing the amount of money student-athletes would have to pay
for the costs of school not covered by their scholarships. 8 . The NCAA's
own witness, economic expert Dr. Daniel Rubinfield, actually stated, "the
NCAA does impose a restraint, the restraint we have been discussing in this
case" and did not deny that the NCAA restricts competition for recruits.28 '
Dr. Rubinfield actually stated in one of his books that the NCAA is a
"cartel," which Judge Wilken weighed heavily in favor of the plaintiffs in
ultimately holding that the NCAA's restrictions on student-athletes through
its member schools was an anti-competitive restraint of trade on the college
282
education market as well as the group licensing market.

276. Id.
277. Id. at *7. Cost of attendance calculates transportation, school supplies, and other
expenses incidental to attending school that full grant-in-aid is not permitted to cover under
NCAA rules. Id. at *8.
278. Id. at *22.

279. Id. "In other words, an agreement between competitors to 'share profits' or to make
a third party the exclusive seller of their competing products that has the purpose and effect
of fixing, stabilizing, or raising prices may be a per se violation of the Sherman Act, even if no
explicit price is referenced in the agreement." Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino,
Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 336-37 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
280.

O'Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *8.

281. Id.
282. Id. at *8-9, "21.
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The plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA and its member schools were not
just a monopoly, but also a monopsony, since the NCAA could be
characterized as buyers for the student-athletes' services as well.2"3 Judge
Wilken upheld this argument citing another antitrust case involving the
NCAA, In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation, where the
NCAA was sufficiently alleged to be a buyer in competition for collegiate
football players.2"' The NCAA ultimately disagreed with the
characterization of the NCAA as buyers as well as sellers, and claimed that
the only way for a buyer to restrain an input market in an anticompetitive
way is if that restraint ultimately harms consumers by "reducing output or
raising prices in a downstream market.""' However, the Supreme Court in
Mandesville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co. held that
"monopsonistic practices that harm suppliers may violate antitrust law even
if they do not ultimately harm consumers."2" 6 Thus, even labor markets can
give rise to an antitrust violation.2"7 Ultimately, Judge Wilken ruled that the
plaintiffs established sufficient evidence for determining that studentathletes, as both buyers and as sellers of their name, image, and likeness
rights, were placed under anticompetitive restraints as a monopoly and
monopsony, and thus shifted the burden back on the NCAA.2 ss
b.

Group license market

Judge Wilken also accepted the plaintiffs' identification of group
licensing markets as relevant markets under a challenged restraint.2 9 The
plaintiffs split the group licensing markets into three sub-groups: video
games, live game telecasts, and re-broadcasts and archival footage.29 °

283. Id. at *23.

284. Id. "Plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient 'input' market in which NCAA member
schools compete for skilled amateur football players." In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football
Players Litig., 398 F.Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
285. O'Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *24.
286. Id. (citing Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)).
287. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 365
(1926) (holding that a multi-employer agreement among ship owners restrained trade in a
labor market for sailors); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 201 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
that a conspiracy among oil industry employers to set salaries at "artificially low levels"
restrained trade in a labor market and noting that "a horizontal conspiracy among buyers [of
labor] to stifle competition is as unlawful as one among sellers.").
288. O'Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *24-25.
289. Id. at *6-9.
290. Id. at *5.
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The plaintiffs' primary argument for these sub-categories was that since
student-athletes are not permitted by NCAA rules to license their name,
likeness, or image rights to television networks, the conferences and their
member schools have the exclusive licensing rights with these television
networks. 291' But for the NCAA rules, the student-athletes would be
permitted to sell group licenses to any television networks, or a third party
such as the school, which would then levy each network's bids for the group
licenses to establish a market price for those rights. 2
The NCAA first argued that under the First Amendment and state law
student-athletes do not have the ability to assert their right of publicity over
their image, name, and likeness rights.293 Judge Wilken quickly shot down
this argument since she had previously established that all of the original
defendants in this case were not protected by the First Amendment in
asserting the use of the plaintiffs' name, image, and likeness rights.294 The
NCAA also contended through its expert witness that television networks
did not need the players' consent when broadcasting live television
games.29 The plaintiffs then pointed to provisions from NCAA licensing
agreements with CBS for March Madness telecast rights in 1994 and Fox
broadcasting agreements with several FBS conferences for the rights to
televise certain bowl games. The language specifically stated that Fox had
the "'rights to use the name and likeness, photographs and biographies of all
participants, game officials, cheerleaders and other individuals connected to
'
the game."296
Judge Wilken determined that these contracts sufficiently
established that relevant markets existed for group license rights among
television networks, and thatplayers would be compensated were it not for
the NCAA rules preventing them from doing so. 297
However, despite ruling that the relevant market existed, Judge Wilken
determined that the plaintiffs did not identify any harm to the competition
in the group licensing market for live television broadcasts. 29 Even though
the judge held that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged harm to themselves
through the group licensing market, the "injury must go 'beyond the impact
on the claimant' and reach a 'field of commerce in which the claimant is
291. Id. at *25.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.

295. Id. at *6.
296. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Id.
298. Id. at *26.
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engaged."'299 She held that the restraint of competition in that market must
be proven."' The judge determined that the sellers in this relevant market
would be the student-athletes, and thus, in order to prevail, the plaintiffs
would have to prove that if the NCAA rules did not exist, teams of studentathletes would compete against each other to sell their group licensing
rights. 31 However, Judge Wilken reasoned that television networks would
have to get group licenses from every school or the marketplace for
televised games would not exist.3" 2 If one school sold its student-athletes'
group licensing right, but the school that it was competing against did not,
the television network would have no desire or ability to broadcast the
game. 33 Thus, the group license of the student-athletes from every Division
I school or individual conference would have to be sold or the group
licenses would carry no value whatsoever.3 4 This is how the current system
already operates. Since no matter how the group licensing rights were sold,
the teams of student-athletes from individual schools would never actually
compete in the marketplace, and because the networks already compete for
the student-athletes' group licensing telecast rights, albeit through the
conferences and schools, Judge Wilken held that no anticompetitive effects
exist in the live telecast market.305
Judge Wilken also held that video game group licenses would be
considered as a relevant market for players except that the NCAA rules
forbid them. 0 6 The plaintiffs utilized testimony from EA's vice president
that said that EA attempts to make the games as "authentic as possible" and
that customers prefer more realistic depictions of athletes' likenesses.07 The
NCAA's only defense to this was that it stopped granting group licenses for
NCAA student-athletes to video game producers.0 8 Judge Wilkbn pointed
to past production of EA's collegiate video game series along with the fact
that the NCAA never guaranteed it would stop making video games in the

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. (quoting Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *26-27.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *7.
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were identical to their
future." 9 She held that past uses of players' likenesses
310
real-life persona, and thus, a relevant market exists.

Despite proving the existence of a relevant market for video games, Judge
Wilken also did not agree that the NCAA rules produced anticompetitive
3
effects that restrained group licensing rights in the sub-market. ,I
Implementing similar rationale from the live television sub-group, Judge
Wilken held that even though players suffered individual injury from the
NCAA's rules, the group license rights of players from each school would be
valueless if not all of the schools' group licenses were obtained by the video
game producer, since the video games would not be successful without
including every Division I school. 312 Thus, the players from each school
would have no incentive to compete for higher group license prices than
other schools' student-athletes.313
Lastly, Judge Wilken found that re-broadcasts, highlights, and archival
usage of NCAA game footage was also a relevant market. 4 She pointed to
testimony from the NCAA's vice president, Mark Lewis, that established
that the NCAA licensed all of its archival footage to a licensing company
named T3Media.31 5
Judge Wilken held that the plaintiffs did not provide evidence that the
NCAA imposes any restraints on the market. 6 Since the NCAA's
agreement with T3Media expressly prohibited selling any media licenses
that featured current student-athletes, Judge Wilken held that no current
student-athletes suffered any harm. 7 Additionally, even if the plaintiffs did
show evidence of an injury, there is no restraint on the market for
competition because, barring the NCAA rules, T3Media would have to
obtain a group license from each individual school, making each individual
31
school's license valueless unless they could all be obtained as one unit. 1
Thus, by denying that the NCAA's rules placed an anticompetitive restraint
on the live telecast, video game, and media archive markets, all of the

309. Id.
310. Id.

311. Id. at*28.
312. Id.
313. Id.

314. Id. at* 7.
315. Id.
316. Id. at*29.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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plaintiffs' group licensing claims were defeated, leaving only the college
education market claim.
2.

Procompetitive Justifications

Once the plaintiffs prove the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA, the
burden then shifts to the defendant, the NCAA, to establish "redeeming
virtues."3" 9 "Redeeming virtues" must show that the procompetitive aspects
of their bylaws outweigh the anticompetitive effects.3 2° Since Judge Wilken
accepted the plaintiffs' arguments for anticompetitive effects in the college
education market, but denied them in the group licensing market, the
NCAA only needed to show procompetitive justifications for its restraints
on the college education market. In O'Bannon, the NCAA asserted four
procompetitive justifications for its restraints of trade: "(1) the preservation
of amateurism in college sports; (2) promoting competitive balance among
FBS football and Division I basketball teams; (3) the integration of
academics and athletics; and (4) the ability to generate greater output in the
32
relevant markets." '
a.

Amateurism

Judge Wilken shot down the NCAA's amateurism justification in
O'Bannon despite the undeniable success of the use of this justification in
previous cases against the NCAA.322 The NCAA's amateurism defense was
much less effective than in past cases where the courts denied antitrust
claims against the NCAA because its activities were educational and were
carried on to further the principle of amateurism.323 Today, courts have
delineated two different types of NCAA rulemaking foundations in
antitrust cases: 1) those with the objective of furthering an economic
purpose, and 2) those with a noneconomic purpose whose primary intent is
to protect amateurism. 4 This was the approach first implemented in Justice

319. Id.

320. Id. "Redeeming virtues" provide the defendants with a safe harbor should the
plaintiffs meet their required burden of proof for anticompetitive effects. If the defendants
can prove the restriction's precompetitive effects outweigh its anticompetitive effects, there is
a redeeming virtue and the issue is ruled in favor of the defendant. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v.
FTC 526 U.S. 786, 786 (1999).
321. O'Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *29.
322. Id.
323. See Smith v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1998);
Gaines v. Nat'l CollegiateAthletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743-44 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
324. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 743 (citing Justice v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F.
Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983)).
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v. NCAA that is now adopted by almost all federal jurisdictions in
determining whether a restriction is procompetitive or anticompetitive.3"'
In cases where the bylaw is implemented to protect amateurism, a
presumption is given to the NCAA because such rules are the primary
purpose of the NCAA's organizational approach-to further its educational
purpose and demarcate college athletics from professional sports.326
The NCAA's chief argument was that the tradition and identity of college
sports are directly attributed to the popularity of the sport.327 Judge Wilken,
in O'Bannon, found that the primary purpose of the NCAA's restrictions on
student-athlete compensation was not to preserve amateurism, as evidenced
by the history of NCAA Bylaws. 2 Judge Wilken cited the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Agnew v. NCAA in determining that the scholarships
given to student-athletes by schools are in fact commercial transactions
since schools stand to make millions from their athletic programs."9 The
NCAA cited dicta from the Supreme Court case NCAA v. Board of Regents
of Oklahoma, where the Court said that in order to preserve the quality of
the NCAA's product, student-athletes "must not be paid."330 Judge Wilken
held that this statement was not based on any factual findings but was
merely dicta and was counterintuitive to the NCAA's chief defense where it
claimed that the NCAA was not "relying on amateurism as a
procompetitive justification." 331 Citing the history of the NCAA's bylaws,
Judge Wilken determined that, due to the inconsistency and frequent
changes to the rules regarding student-athlete compensation, there is no
325. See Justice v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983)
("In sum, it is clear that the NCAA is now engaged in two distinct kinds of rulemaking
activity. One type, exemplified by the rules in Hennessey and Jones, is rooted in the NCAA's
concern for the protection of amateurism; the other type is increasingly accompanied by a
discernible economic purpose."); see also Smith v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d
180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1998); In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d
1144, 1148-49 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Jones v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295,
303 (D. Mass. 1975).

326. Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382 (citing Hennessey v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564
F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977)); see Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 303.
327. O'Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at *29.
328. Id.at*10.
329. Id. at *21 (quoting Agnew v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 683 F.3d 328 (2012)

("[T]ransactions between NCAA schools and student-athletes are, to some degree,
commercial in nature, and therefore take place in a relevant market with respect to the
Sherman Act.")).
330. Id. at *29 (quoting Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)).
331. Id.
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concrete definition of amateurism even though it is purported to be one of
332
the NCAA's core principles.
The NCAA also attempted to show, through surveys and comparisons to
professional sports leagues, that by paying student-athletes more, the public
would lose interest in the sport.333 Judge Wilken discredited the survey
saying it was not credible evidence to support the idea that consumer
interest in the NCAA would decline.334 Ultimately, there was no evidence
that supported the idea that throughout its history the NCAA's removal of
incidental expenses or other changes it made to the grant-in-aid paid to
student-athletes had an impact on the popularity of college sports. 33 ' Thus,
Judge Wilken found that restrictions on compensating student-athletes
were not directly correlated to consumer demand for NCAA football and
basketball.336
b.

Competitive balance

The second of the NCAA's justifications for its restrictions on
compensating student-athletes was its desire to maintain a competitive
balance amongst its member schools.337 While the Supreme Court had
previously ruled that "a sports league's efforts to achieve the optimal
competitive balance among its teams may serve a procompetitive purpose if
promoting such competitive balance increases demand for the league's
product," Judge Wilken did not find that applied in O'Bannon. 3' Although
Board of Regents had determined that maintaining a competitive balance
was a procompetitive justification, Judge Wilken determined that it was not
binding precedent due to the factual discrepancies between the two cases.339
She alluded to reports published by the academic community, along with
expert testimony, in determining that the NCAA's compensation rules have
332. Id. at *30.
333. Id. at *10-12. The NCAA utilized testimony from Dr. J.Michael Dennis in regard to
a poll he conducted over a sample size of approximately 2,500 people. Id. The results showed
that 69% expressed opposition to paying student-athletes. Id. Judge Wilken said that the poll
did not ask questions pertaining to paying student-athletes for their image rights and was too
general. Id. It also did not support the fact that a large part population would stop watching
the sports altogether. Id.
334. Id. at*ll.
335.

Id. at*12.

336. Id.
337. Id. at *13.

338. Id. at *14, 31 (citing Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 204
(2010)).
339. Id. at *32.
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no effect on the competitive balance among its member schools.34 Several
witnesses even stated that by restricting the amounts paid to studentathletes, schools simply spend the money they save on other areas, such as
coaches' salaries, training budgets, facilities, and recruiting."' She alluded to
the NCAA's distribution scheme, which awards the most money to those
schools that already have the largest budgets to work with, as another
reason to strike down the NCAA's argument.M Ultimately, Judge Wilken
stated that all evidence went against the NCAA for this justification, and the
NCAA was never able to delineate anything more than an ambiguous
determination of the competitive balance that is required to maximize their
consumer demand.343
c.

Integration of academics and athletics

Another justification the NCAA offered for the restriction on athlete's
compensation was that doing so integrates academics and athletics, which
increases the quality of educational services that schools can provide their
student-athletes. 3 4 The NCAA pointed to the testimony of their expert
witness, Dr. James Heckman, who testified that the NCAA is able to provide
tutoring, academic support, mentorship, and other educational services
which lead to significantly greater academic and labor market outcomes for
student-athletes over other socioeconomic groups.

345

Judge Wilken rejected

this argument, holding that none of those benefits are actually mandated by
the NCAA, but rather are done independently through the school's own
discretion.346 While there are some NCAA .rules that promote academic
integration, the NCAA's only argument that seemed valid to Judge Wilken
was that by paying student-athletes more, they would "create a wedge"
between student-athletes and normal students that would cause them to be
viewed differently.347 However, this too was not enough of a justification for
Judge Wilken, who found that the same argument could be made for
wealthy students.348 Further, Judge Wilken pointed to the plaintiffs'
testimony from Ed O'Bannon, who said he felt like "an athlete

340. Id. at*13.
341.

Id.

342.

Id.

343.

Id. at*13-14.

344. Id. at *14.
345.

Id.

346. Id.
347. Id. (citation omitted).
348. Id.
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masquerading as a student" during college, even under the current NCAA
rules.349 Since athletes would still receive all of the same educational benefits
regardless of compensation, Judge Wilken rejected this justification.35 °
Thus, the NCAA had one remaining justification.
d. Increased output
By restricting student-athletes' compensation, the NCAA claimed that
they limit costs, enable more schools to participate in Division I basketball
and FBS football, and also attract schools with a "philosophical
commitment to amateurism.""' However, Judge Wilken also rejected this
justification.3" 2 She claimed that the number of schools that participate in
those two sports has increased because participating in those sports raises
the school's public profile and generates additional revenue.353 She justified
her rationale by pointing to the fact that several bigger schools are
promoting the raising of grant-in-aid for their student-athletes.35 4
Additionally, there is no evidence that shows that any Division I schools
originally joined due to the NCAA's amateurism rules, when they could
have just joined Division II, III, or even the NAIA, all of whom implement
the same amateurism principles.355 This instead points to a solely financial
motivation.35 6 While the NCAA was able to show that many Division I
schools operate at a financial loss and increasing costs would cause them to
drop their athletic programs altogether, several school's athletic directors
testified that they would continue to participate in NCAA Division I sports
even if student-athletes were required to be paid more.357 Judge Wilken also
noted that the plaintiffs' suit does not demand that schools compensate
student-athletes more, but rather demands that it give schools the option to
pay their student-athletes more.35 '

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at *15 (citation omitted).
Id. at *32.
Id. at*33.
Id. at *16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *15.
Id. at*15-16.
Id. at *16.
Id. at *33.
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Less Restrictive Alternatives

Since the NCAA was able to justify their procompetitive restrictions
successfully, the burden shifted back to the plaintiff to show that there were
less restrictive alternatives to the one in place.359 In O'Bannon, the plaintiffs
suggested three less restrictive means:
(1) raise the grant-in-aid limit to allow schools to award stipends,
derived from specified sources of licensing revenue, to studentathletes; (2) allow schools to deposit a share of licensing revenue
into a trust fund for student-athletes which could be paid after
the student-athletes graduate or leave school for other reasons; or
(3) permit student-athletes to receive limited compensation for
third-party endorsements approved by their schools.36
Ultimately, Judge Wilken held that two of these alternatives were
legitimate.36
Judge Wilken held that raising grant-in-aid would be a less restrictive
alternative on the condition that such grant-in-aid does not exceed the full
cost of attendance, thus maintaining compliance with NCAA amateurism
rules.362 She said that raising the scholarship cap would not have any effect
on the NCAA's consumer demand, and it would actually help integrate
student-athletes into the academic community, which ultimately would lead
363
to a better education for the student-athletes.
Plaintiffs' second proposal in the lawsuit was that money from group
licenses be set aside in trusts for student-athletes accessible upon
graduation.3" Judge Wilken ultimately ruled on this issue for the plaintiffs
and held that establishing a trust for student-athletes to access upon
graduation would be a less restrictive alternative to the current NCAA
restrictions.3 65 The trusts would consist of a percentage of all licensing
revenue shares that student-athletes were entitled to receive during their
career.3 66 The defendant's own witness noted that he would not be troubled
if such a trust was established and that it would actually lessen his concerns

359.

Id. at *34.

360.

Id. at *16.

361.

Id. at *35.

362.

Id. at *16.

363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at *35.
366. Id. at*17.
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about paying student-athletes.3 67 Ultimately, Judge Wilken held that a
school established trust is a viable alternative to paying student-athletes,
and that the NCAA can only cap the amount a player receives from each
year of participation in college athletics at $5,000 per year. 36" This would
allow a player at a school that implements such a trust to collect upwards of
$20,000 upon graduation. Judge Wilken justified limiting the amount
student-athletes could receive by citing one witness's testimony who
hypothesized that the ultimate effect paying student-athletes would have on
consumer demand would depend upon the amount of money that they
were paid.369 In addition to limiting the amount student-athletes could be
paid, making the student-athletes wait until after their collegiate careers are
over to collect the trust funds would further minimize the negative effect on
consumer demand.370 Judge Wilken also recommended that the NCAA
create a restriction that prevents players from taking out any loans on the
trust prior to graduation so as to prevent any abuse.37'
The only less restrictive alternative proposed by the O'Bannon plaintiffs
that Judge Wilken did not approve of was the idea of allowing players to be
granted their own image rights so that they can contract with third parties
for endorsements.37 2 Wilken's rationale was that allowing student-athletes
to partake in endorsement opportunities would negate the amateurism
concept and its policy of preventing the "commercial exploitation" of
student-athletes.373 She ultimately held that it did not provide less restrictive
means to the current NCAA restrictions.374
Ultimately, Judge Wilken ruled:
[T]he NCAA's challenged rules unreasonably restrain trade in
violation of [Section] 1 of the Sherman Act. Specifically, the
association's rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving
any compensation for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses restrains price competition among FBS football and
Division I basketball schools as suppliers of the unique
combination of educational and athletic opportunities that elite
football and basketball recruits seek. Alternatively, the rules
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id.
Id. at *37.
Id. at *17.
Id.
Id.

372. Id.

373. Id.
374. Id.
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restrain trade in the market where these schools compete to
acquire recruits' athletic services and licensing rights. 75
Since the plaintiffs were able to identify less restrictive alternatives after
prevailing in the suit, Judge Wilken issued an injunction against the NCAA
prohibiting it from restricting Division I basketball and FBS football schools
from offering a limited share of the revenue generated from the use of their
names, images, and likenesses in addition to a fall grant-in-aid.3 76 The
injunction also prohibits the NCAA from preventing its member schools
from establishing a trust holding name, image, and likeness group license
proceeds for each student-athlete that is accessible upon graduation.377 The
injunction does not, however, prevent the NCAA from capping the amount
of compensation student-athletes can be paid, but it does require that such
limit not be set below the cost of attendance, as it currently exists.37 The
injunction prohibits the NCAA from capping the amount of the trust
accessible to each student-athlete upon graduation at less than $5,000 per
year of participation in college athletics.379 The injunction does not prohibit
the NCAA from making any other sort of rules regarding student-athlete
compensation, such as a rule that does not allow a school to offer a recruit a
greater amount of the trust after graduation than others." The amount of
compensation that the schools place in the trust may vary from year to
year.3 ' All other NCAA rules will remain in effect as the plaintiffs only
challenged the rules stated above.382 Thus, the NCAA violated antitrust law
by agreeing with its member schools and setting limits on the amount
student-athletes could be compensated. The current ruling will become
effective during the next recruiting cycle for Division I basketball and FBS
football.383
VII. AN ATHLETE-TAILORED APPROACH
Pending appeal, O'Bannon is a minor step toward correcting the flaws in
the NCAA. But there are still several tweaks that should be made that would
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at *36.
Id.
Id. at *37.
Id. at *36.
Id. at *37.

380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at *36.

383. Id.
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dramatically correct the flaws in the current system and in the O'Bannon
ruling.
One of the most important concerns with changing the NCAA Bylaws, as
evidenced by O'Bannon,3 4 is preserving the concept of amateurism. The
innocence of college athletics is a huge selling point for fans and is what
differentiates it from professional leagues where players are mostly selfinterested. Student-athletes are students first and athletes second; otherwise,
they are not eligible to play. While many will never play professionally, all
student-athletes have the ability to receive a college degree. For many,
receiving an athletic scholarship is the only way they will ever have the
opportunity to receive a college education. Should players start being paid a
salary as opposed to scholarships, college sports may lose some of its
luster-although most fans would still watch due to loyalty and pride
towards their schools. In a poll conducted by the NCAA's witness in
O'Bannon, 69% of the 2,455 surveyed said they opposed paying college
athletes and would be less inclined to watch college athletics if studentathletes were paid a salary of $20,000 per year.3 5 To keep this survey in
perspective, however, Judge Wilken observed many flaws in the way the poll
was conducted and did not see the poll as persuasive.3

6

Still, there is some

validity to the statistic.
Recently, athletes at Northwestern University have attempted to form the
first ever union for college athletes.387 While this is an applause-worthy
effort, the players do not realize that they are likely doing more harm than
good for their fellow student-athletes. To shortly address a very complicated
issue, should student-athletes become part of a union, they are then
considered employees and the school would be considered employers.388
The NCAA would then likely get rid of the idea of a scholarship and simply
pay recruits a yearly salary. As employees, all income they derive then
becomes taxable, and does not fall within the current tax shield that athletic
scholarships currently fall under.38 9 Issues of employer liability and worker's
compensation would derive as a result,39 and the NCAA's non-profit
384. See discussion supra Part VI.A.2.a.
385. O'Bannon, 2014 WL 3899815, at "10-11.
386. Id. at*11.
387. Jake New, Northwestern Gets an Assist, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 7, 2014), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2014/07/07/ncaa-republican-lawmakers-back-northwesterns-appealfootball-player-union.
388. Id.
389. 26 U.S.C.A. § 61(a)(1) (West 2012); Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47.
390. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). If student-athletes were considered

employees, the universities could be held liable for torts that may occur in an athletic event
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classification would also be jeopardized.39 This would destroy the concept
of "amateurism" as we know it.
Another complex issue that could be addressed in its own separate
article, Title IX requires equal treatment and equal opportunities be given to
women as they are men, including in college sports.392 Paying studentathletes more would require more money to also be pumped into women's
programs at the same schools since "[f]emale and male student-athletes
must receive athletics scholarship dollars proportional to their
participation."393 The problem is that typically women's basketball is the
only women's athletic program that can make any sort of profit for the
school, while men's basketball and football can make millions.394 If the
federal government were to require equal sums of money to also be
distributed to women's sports, this could cause many schools to drop their
non-revenue athletics programs altogether.
Lastly, paying players more than an athletic scholarship scares many
schools because, unless they are in the Big 5 conferences, many schools
struggle to make a profit in their athletic programs. Only about 19% of
schools actually profit off of their athletic programs as an aggregate.3 95 The
Big 5 conferences only account for 60 of the 120 FBS football teams. 9 6 That
still leaves half of the FBS football players unaccounted for. In basketball,
profitable programs account for roughly 17% of the total Division I

or even outside of the event if the court determined that the employee was acting within the
scope of his employment. Id. "An employer is subject to liability for torts committed by
employees while acting within the scope of their employment." Id.
391. Ivan Maisel, Paying Players Might Create Havoc, ESPN (July 15, 2011),
http://espn.go.com /college-sports/story/Jid/6768571/legal-issues-arise-paying-student-athletes.
392. Title IX FrequentlyAsked Questions, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/inclusion/title-ix-frequently-asked- questions
(last
visited Dec. 20, 2014).
393. Id.
394. See discussion supra Part II.B.
395. Rachel Bachman & Matthew Futterman, College Football's Big-Money, Big-Risk
Business Model, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2012) available at http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424127887324024004578169472607407806. When a student enrolls in a
school, he typically has access to the estimated full cost of attendance that he is likely to incur
over the course of the school year. See Cost to Attend U-M, UNIV. OF MICH.,
http://www.finaid.umich.edu/TopNav/AboutUMFinancialAid/CostofAttendance.aspx
(last
visited Dec. 20, 2014).
396. NCAA
FBS
(Division
I-A)
Football
Standings-2014,
ESPN,
http://espn.go.com/college-football/standings (last visited Dec. 20, 2014).
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basketball programs. 397 Additionally, by creating a market for players where
teams could pay recruits any sum of money, the big schools would prevail
almost every time. Even in simply requiring a full cost-of-attendance
scholarship as opposed to a full grant-in-aid scholarship, as is currently in
place, schools could pay up to as much as an additional $10,000 per year per
player. For the smaller schools not making a profit, this would become
overbearing. The teams from smaller conferences with limited funds would
have virtually no resources to compete with the Big 5 conferences. Thus, the
Cinderella stories in March Madness and the major upsets in college
football, which make college sports so captivating, would become even rarer
and many schools would have to cut out several of their athletic programs
just to stay afloat. In short, the rich would become richer and the parity
would increase.
As it stands now, the aforementioned provisions in the NCAA Bylaws,
NCAA Form 08-3a, the National Letter of Intent, and the other documents
that constitute a scholarship, likely violate student-athletes' rights of
publicity.39 They also violate antitrust laws as seen in O'Bannon.399 This
Comment suggests an approach to reform the NCAA scholarship contract
and its accompanying forms that would grant student-athletes the
following: sole possession of their individual image rights while in college,
and mandated full cost-of-attendance scholarships to student-athletes in the
revenue-earning sports. All this can be added while maintaining the
concept of amateurism that makes the NCAA so appealing to the masses
and ensures athletes are students first above all else.
A. Grant Players Their Individual Name, Likeness, and Image Rights
The first step in resolving the current NCAA dilemma is to nullify those
provisions from the NCAA Bylaws and scholarship contract that restrict a
student-athlete's right of publicity."0 By simply doing this, the contracts

397. College Basketball Teams, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/teams
(last visited Dec. 20, 2014). There are currently 351 NCAA Division I basketball teams. Id.
Thus, 60 (schools from the five major conferences) divided by 351 (total schools) would
equal roughly 17%.
398. See discussion supra Part V.H.
399. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2014-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 5 78865,
2014 WL 3899815, *36 (N.D. Cal. 2014).

400. See, e.g., NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37, at art. 12.5.2; National Letter of Intent, NCAA
ELIGIBILITY CENTER (Oct. 13, 2014),

http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/CNBC/Sections/News -And-Analysis/_PDF/NLI_2010_201L.pdf; NCAA Form 0&3a, supra note 45.
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entered into with student-athletes would not violate the right of publicity
because they would no longer be ambiguous and the NCAA would have
actual consent.4"' By taking this step, student- athletes would then be free to
contract with third parties through avenues such as advertising,
endorsements, appearances, or autographs. For the sake of this Comment
these individual licenses shall be referred to as "micro licenses."
Additionally, NCAA Bylaw 12.3 should be amended to allow studentathletes to contract with an agent or financial adviser while in school to
assist them in exploring any and all such micro licenses.4 2 Players' names
could be included on the back of jerseys and on gear as well as on video
games, thus making those products more appealing to fans and triggering
even greater sales than the current market allows. Players would get a
portion of these proceeds in a revenue split with the schools.
Student-athletes could only participate in such activity in the offseason,
or some other delineated period, so as not to add on to a student-athlete's
load during the season as both a student and an athlete, and to preserve the
concept of amateurism. Then in the offseason, such micro license activities
could take the place of a job. Since these activities do not require a rigid
schedule, but rather can be worked around a student-athlete's rigorous class
and training schedule, they provide more flexibility to earn money in the
offseason than a standard 9-to-5 job. Additionally, any student-athlete
pursuing such offseason endeavors could be required to meet a certain GPA
requirement before qualifying for such economic activities. This would
encourage student-athletes to keep academics as their main priority,
because failing to do so could result in a significant loss of profits. By
making any income earned derivative of the individual player's name,
image, or likeness rights and through separate pursuits, the income would
not come from the school and, thus, no employer/employee relationship
would be formed. Players would have to pay individual income tax for such
micro license ventures under the Internal Revenue Code section 61.43 This
would still be much better than paying tax on the entire stipend paid to
players if they were paid in salaries instead of athletic scholarships.

401. See discussion supra Part I.A.4.
402. Currently, a student-athlete cannot enter into a representation contract with a third
party to market the athlete's abilities or reputation until his eligibility expires. NCAA Bylaws,
supra note 37, at art. 12.3. By permitting such a relationship, student-athletes could focus
more on school and allow their agent to handle all of their other affairs.
403. 26 U.S.C.A. § 61 (West 2012). Since most players would not generate much income
annually, they likely would pay minimal taxes.
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B. Full Cost-of-Tuition Scholarships
Additionally, the grant-in-aid scholarship would be amended to provide
schools the option of giving players full cost-of-attendance scholarships as
opposed to just full cost-of-tuition scholarships, which do not cover all of a
student-athlete's expenses.4 This would be available to all schools but
would not be mandated. In 1956, students were actually paid a stipend to
cover miscellaneous expenses aside from school, although that was ended a
few decades later.40 1 Since many student-athletes' scholarships do not cover
enough of their daily expenses, and because players do not have much time
to get a job to cover these additional expenses, the full cost-of-attendance
scholarship would help them cover the excess amounts. The full cost of
attendance could be tied to an index, calculating inflation and the market
price of costs in each location of the country in determining the most each
school could pay its student-athletes. In 2014, the NCAA approved
autonomous legislation, which will permit the schools in the Big 5
conferences, along with any other schools that please, to cover the full cost
of attendance if they so desire.406 This is a step in the right direction. One
alternative to this solution is allowing schools to offer full cost-ofattendance scholarships based on each individual player. Higher-rated
recruits could receive a full cost-of-attendance scholarship while lowerrated recruits would just get a full cost-of-tuition scholarship. This would
allow smaller schools in particular to ease their way into such an increase in
spending.
With the many positives that full cost-of-attendance scholarships may
resolve, there are problems that exist with this system, just like with every
system. Even if student-athletes still are not considered employees,
scholarship tax consequences exist for the players. The tax code specifically
provides that scholarships used to pay tuition, fees, books, supplies, or

404. How Do Athletic Scholarships Work?, NCAA (2012), *
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/NCAA%2BAthletics%2BScholarships.pdf.
405. Ivan Maisel, Full Cost of Attendance Gains Traction, ESPN (July 14, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/co lege-sports/story/-/id/6765762/ful-cost-attendance-student-athletesgaining-traction. "In 1956, the membership approved a model to cover 'commonly accepted
educational expenses' that included tuition, room, board, books, fees and a stipend of $15
per month for the nine-month academic calendar. That stipend came as close to covering
personal expenses as the NCAA cared to tread." Id. This stipend was later eliminated in the
1970s. Id.
406. Patrick Rishe, Will Big 5 Autonomy Create Greater Competitive Imbalance In
College Athletics?, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2014/08/
07/wiu-big-5-autonomy-create-greater-competitive-imbaance-in-college-athetics/.
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equipment are not taxable income.4" 7 When the scholarship is used for any
other school-related expenses, however, like travel, or any other funds the
full cost-of-attendance scholarships might cover, it is considered gross
income that the student-athlete must pay taxes on.4 °s The IRS would have to
implement a new regulation defining athletic scholarships to include the
full cost of attendance and exempting them from the current regulations.
While it may not be practical for every school to implement a full costof-attendance scholarship, providing all schools the option, not simply
those in the Big 5 conferences, would create more parity than the
alternative. It still would not mandate that smaller schools award full costof-attendance scholarships, but it would allow them to rework their budgets
to stay competitive with the bigger schools, possibly sacrificing some of the
outrageous amounts of money spent on coaches or other facets of the
program to remain competitive. Some smaller schools have already begun
enacting full cost-of-attendance scholarships.4 9
Congress would also have to re-hear Revenue Ruling 77-263, making not
just athletic scholarships tax exempt but redefining the term "athletic

407. 26 U.S.C.A. § I17(a), (b)(1)(B) (West 2012). The codes reads, in pertinent part:
Gross income does not include any amount received as a qualified scholarship
by an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational organization.
• . .The term "qualified scholarship" means any amount received by an
individual as a scholarship or fellowship grant to the extent the individual
establishes that, in accordance with the conditions of the grant, such amount
was used for qualified tuition and . . .fees, books, supplies, and equipment
required for courses of instruction at such an educational organization.
Id. Any portion of the scholarship that is not used by one of the five designations mentioned
above is taxable as gross income of the recipient. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(1), 53 Fed.
Reg. 21,688 (June 9, 1988); see also IRS, Withholding Federal Income Tax on Scholarships,
Fellowships, and Grants Paid to Aliens, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/InternationalTaxpayers/Withholding-Federal-Income-Tax-on-Scholarships,- Fellowships,-and-GrantsPaid-to-Aliens (last visited Dec. 20, 2014). While any scholarship that is given in return for
services received is considered taxable income under 26 U.S.C. § 117, the IRS created an
exception for athletic scholarships. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47. If, however, a full cost
of attendance scholarship is awarded, which goes beyond the scope of Rev. Rul. 77-263, then
unless Congress creates another exception, the portion outside of qualified tuition given to
the student-athletes will be considered taxable income according to 26 U.S.C. § 61 and 26
U.S.C. § 117. 26 U.S.C.A. § 61 (West 2012); 26 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West 2012); Rev. Rul. 77-263,
1977-2 C.B. 47..
408. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(1), 53 Fed. Reg.
21,688 (June 9, 1988).
409. Aaron Drawhorn, Lobo Athletes to Have More Spending Money, KRQE NEws (Mar.
26, 2015), http://krqe.com/2015/03/26/lobo-athletes-to-have-more-spending-money/.
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scholarship" to include the entirety of the full cost-of-attendance
scholarship, including the incidental school expenses it covers.410
C. Fully Guaranteed,4-year Scholarships
Currently, many schools only offer one-year guaranteed scholarships.4 '
The full cost-of-attendance scholarships would be guaranteed for four years
with two exceptions; a scholarship is not guaranteed if a player repeatedly
violates NCAA Bylaws or turns professional prior to finishing school, along
with any other fair exceptions formulated in the process. Guaranteeing
scholarships for all four years would prevent institutions from pulling
scholarships for players who were injured while playing for the school, or
for pulling the scholarships because they want to offer them to a better
player.
D. Reject the O'Bannon GroupLicensing Trust Approach
Third parties would still need to contract with the NCAA or the schools
for licensing rights that do not depend on the individual athlete's image
rights but rather capitalize on the concept of a school as a whole. For the
sake of this Comment, these will be called "macro licenses." If students are
granted their individual image rights, or micro licenses, as well as granted
full cost-of-attendance scholarships as previously mentioned, the group
licensing trust approach as outlined in O'Bannon is not necessary." Players
could bundle their names together and grant the companies the use of the
bundle of their names, images, and likeness rights and split the revenue in
any way they see fit, in instances like video games. Players could also
410. Rev. Rul. 77-263, 1977-2 C.B. 47.
411. John Solomon, Schools Can Give Out 4-Year Athletic Scholarships, but Many Don't,
CBS SPORTS (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/onsolomon/24711067/schools-can-give-out-4-year-scholarships-to-athletes-but-many-dont.
412. A tiered approach similar to the revenue sharing concept mentioned above could be
implemented instead and student-athletes could receive their money as soon as the
agreement distributed the revenue. By placing the student-athletes' money in a trust fund
not accessible until they exhausted their eligibility, however, it avoids the creation of an
agency relationship and instead creates more of an independent contractor relationship,
eliminating many of the vicarious liability concerns. Additionally, it maintains the current
concept of amateurism by not allowing student-athletes to accept compensation for their
athletic abilities, and keeping the emphasis on the schools instead of the individual players
The revenue splits devoted to student-athletes would depend on the macro license being
issued. For instance, media contracts would distribute a total of 5% to the player trust fund.
Only 2% of merchandise sales not containing a player's identity would be distributed to the
players' fund since the team is the entity driving the sale and not the individual athlete.
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contract individually. Either way, an additional $20,000, as created by
O'Bannon that could possibly be paid to each player upon graduation, is a
steep amount that would destroy the parity of college athletics and would
force many programs to stop competing all together.4 13 Combining these
O'Bannon trusts with full cost-of-attendance scholarships could cost a
school paying that amount to two hundred student-athletes over $2
million.414
Upon graduation, players would be fully released from their scholarship
contracts with the NCAA and would have to be additionally compensated
for any use of their image rights beyond licenses issued while in college.
Images of student-athletes could still be utilized after the player graduated
as long as they consisted of the player's image and likeness while the player
was in college, but not beyond. Third parties would then have to contract
with individual student-athletes for any use of the student-athlete's postcollege image or likeness.
VIII. CONCLUSION

This Comment's approach does not suggest the direct payment of a
salary by the NCAA or the schools to enrolled student-athletes, as many
have suggested. It is not practical to pay players a salary out of school funds
when only 19% of Division I schools reported a profit last year from their
athletics.4 15 Forcing schools to pay too much more above the current
scholarship amount would make many schools. cut out their athletic
programs altogether.4 16 What is practical is to give schools the option of
awarding full cost-of-attendance scholarships, which would not cost much
more than $4,000 per student-athlete annually.4" 7 Additionally, granting
each player his individual name, image, and likeness rights would allow
players to earn additional income, which would not be paid from each
school's funds. This would help level the playing field and not necessarily
deter an athlete from choosing a smaller school for fear of loss of
opportunity. A five-star recruit could capitalize on the hype surrounding
him no matter what school he attends because it is his individual brand that
413. See Michael Smith, Is Cindarella Dead?, SPORTS Bus. J. (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2014/11/10/In-Depth/Lead.aspx.
414. Id.

415. Bachman, supra note 395.
416. Id.
417. Mitch Sherman, Full Cost of Attendance Passes 79-1, ESPN (Jan. 18, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/-/id/12185230/power-5-conferences-pass-costattendance-measure-ncaa-autonomy-begins.
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carries the value. Lastly, making the full cost-of-attendance scholarships
guaranteed for all four years would give players more security in an
otherwise volatile situation.
The beauty of all of these solutions is that they could be implemented
without creating the dangerous employer/employee relationship and
without unionizing college athletics. Johnny Manziel, Todd Gurley, A.J.
Green, and Terrelle Pryor would no longer be considered "perpetrators,"
but rather would receive the compensation they rightfully deserved all
along. Should such solutions be implemented, the NCAA Bylaws would no
longer be a hypocritical, contradictory set of documents, but would actually
protect student-athletes from "exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises," including protection from the NCAA itself.4"'

418. NCAA Bylaws, supra note 37.

